


REFRAMING STABILITY OPERATIONS: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE  
TO IDENTIFY PILLARS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS  
TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES  
OF JOINT OPERATIONS AND STABILITY  
OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK



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## ABSTRACT

### REFRAMING STABILITY OPERATIONS: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO IDENTIFY PILLARS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS AND STABILITY OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK, by Major Ethan H. Harding, USMC, 151 pages.

Recent Government and Department of Defense publications designate stability operations as a core military mission, leading to its parity amongst other more traditional military missions along the spectrum of armed conflict. However, doctrine fails to account for the constructive nature of stability operations when compared to the destructive nature of the offense or defense. While both FM 3-07 *Stability Operations* and the new joint Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and United States Institute for Peace's *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction* provide frameworks for the conduct of stability operations, there exists an institutional difficulty in achieving operational success. This leads one to question whether the proposed frameworks are correct, and if they can be improved upon. The problem lies in 2001, with the combining of the MOOTW Principles and the Principles of War. While this accounted for many common efforts and eventually led to the emergence of the Full Spectrum Operations concept, doing so erased parameters that provided unique guidance to the conduct of stability operations. This thesis addresses this doctrinal gap through social science by identifying what needs all people have, Drivers of Instability, and how stable societies adapt to ensure needs are met and avoid unstable behavior. It then critiques examples of need-fulfillment interventions, and the reasons behind their success. This analysis deduces certain Pillars, rooted in social science and validated against historical examples, which govern the unique conduct of stability operations. These Pillars of Stability Operations provide a theoretical basis that nests in the Principles of Joint Operations and complements the existing frameworks in FM 3-07 and *Guiding Principles*, making the execution of stability operations more efficient and effective

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## ACRONYMS

ARVN	Army, Republic of Vietnam
BNA	Basic Needs Approach
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FM	Field Manual
FSS	Fundamentals of Social Stability
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
MACV	Military Assistance Command - Vietnam
OCO	Office of Civil Operations
PDI	Primary Driver of Instability
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [U.S. Army]
RD	Rural Development cadre
SDI	Secondary Driver of Instability
SGA	Small Group Advisor
TDI	Tertiary Driver of Instability
TPP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
VC	Viet Cong
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

In 2005, NSPD-44 tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) with making the conduct of stability operations as one of their “core missions.” The Department of Defense, in DoD Directive 3000.5, and the Army in FM 3-0, *Operations*, went further by placing stability operations on equal status with the more “conventional” offensive and defensive operations. In the past, the U.S. military engaged in stability operations as an afterthought to traditional lethal operations. Still, such equality and integration between combat missions and stability operations does not always materialize, leading to diminished returns. This ineffectiveness is due to a myriad of issues ranging from poor synchronization to unit leadership lacking confidence in the benefits of executing stability tasks. Even when stability operations enjoy command and unit support, poor analysis and course of action (COA) development results in actions that minimally effect a situation, while other critical issues are not addressed. Even with the advent of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and the newly published U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and United States Institute for Peace (USIP) *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction*, these problems continue to manifest themselves in “cookie-cutter” solutions that are improperly taken from one situational context and placed on another.

## Problem

Although the Army took a large step in following up FM 3-0 with updated doctrine, stability operations continue to suffer from critical gaps in the doctrine itself. Prior to 2001, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)<sup>\*</sup> enjoyed principles that were unique to the existing Principles of War.<sup>1</sup> In September 2001, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* molded these two lists together to form the “Principles of Joint Operations.”<sup>2</sup> This recognized the importance of viewing all operations under common operational principles and paved the way for the Full Spectrum Operations concept implemented by the Army in 2006. While important steps were taken to ensure that stability operations received equal effort and focus amongst the other more traditional missions, this came at the expense of the uniqueness of stability operations when compared to the offense and defense.

Where both the offense and defense have a destructive focus, stability operations are constructive in nature, using lethal actions only as a means to gain security and non-lethal maneuver space. This symbiotic approach to kinetic and non-kinetic efforts is unique to stability operations and requires specific parameters in addition to the Principles of Joint Operations. However, as noted above, the *Joint Operations*, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and the other related manuals in the DoD inventory, contain no foundations, tenets, or pillars that provide a specific baseline for the execution of such missions.<sup>†</sup>

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<sup>\*</sup>MOOTW was the forerunner of what we now call Stability Operations

<sup>†</sup>In paragraph 1-79, FM 3-07 does list out an adaptive framework that serves as a possible underpinning for inclusive USG planning at the operational and tactical levels, consisting of five “end state conditions” (A safe and secure environment, Established rule

This lack of specific guidance is compounded by the doctrinal approaches contained in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, PKSOI/USIP *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction*, and even the stability-related portions of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.<sup>3</sup> Rather than root themselves in the understanding of social science, *Stability Operations*<sup>4</sup> and *Guiding Principles*<sup>5</sup> are compilations of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned gathered from recent nation-building experience. Consequently, current stability operations doctrine lacks both theoretical basis and potential global viability, as the demographics and context that led to previous success may not translate to contemporary scenarios. This does not discount that some methods from recent operational experiences were successful. Rather, the lack of theoretical background in current doctrine means these historical lessons are being considered for future use without understanding *why* they were successful in the first place.

A significant amount of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, mainly chapters 2 and 3, details specific tasks to accomplish in the course of an operation. These directly link to accomplishing Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) end-states. However, no theory exists to explain how or why the accomplishment of these tasks leads

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of law, Social well-being, Stable governance, A sustainable economy). However, while listing out objectives for each individual end state, FM 3-07 “relies on concrete principles and fundamentals in application” of these conditions, yet fails to detail what any of these principles or foundations are. Ironically, there are no established principles or fundamentals for offensive, defensive, or civil-support operations per FM 3-90, *Tactics*, FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, FM 3-0, *Operations*, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Publication*. However, *Offense* enjoys “characteristics” as per FM 3-90. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations* lists out the acronym ASCOPE to help operators detail what exists in an area, but does not attempt to explain what societal institutions should be there. The same goes for USAID’s *Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction* contained in FM 3-07.

to a more stable community. This results in lists of tasks that are grouped together with other related topics, but no purpose or linkage<sup>‡</sup> that allows the operator to understand when certain tasks are more appropriate to solve the problem than others. To correct this, stability operators must understand the institutions and relationships that make societies function.<sup>6</sup>

Such understanding can only come when a stability operator comprehends the basic needs and functions of societies, then analyzes how a historical course of action fulfilled those needs. This allows them to understand the contemporary problem better and adjust the historical solution to fit the current culture and problem. A void of this theoretical understanding predisposes stability operators to focus analysis on identifying threads between current problems and fixes from chosen scenarios. This blinds planners to solutions that fall outside the boundaries of historical experience, resulting in classic, “they did it this way in [insert historical example of choice]” or solutions. Furthermore, the dogmatic execution of tasks, without understanding the true purpose behind them (in terms of societal interrelatedness), limits an operator’s ability to troubleshoot the problem when the execution of such tasks does not yield the desired results, or the problem evolves outside the historical models used to develop the doctrine.

In short, while remaining nested inside the Principles of Joint Operations, we must identify the theoretical foundation to stability operations. Only then can we account for the uniqueness of stability operations inside the Spectrum of Conflict with additional operational governing guidance. These theoretically based guidelines will enable stability

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<sup>‡</sup>In the spirit in which “purpose” relates to “task” in FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*

operators to fully comprehend societal interrelatedness and enable more efficient action and success on the ground, rather than the trial and error experienced by many in this decade.

### Primary Research Question

What are the Pillars of Stability Operations?

### Secondary Research Question #1

What needs, institutions, and functions are common to all stable societies?

### Secondary Research Question #2

What are the “smart practices” of historical stability operations?

### Assumptions

This thesis assumes the following: first, continuing global volatility will cause a sustained rise in fragile and failed states. This rise in instability will drive an increase of humanitarian and military interventions, creating an opportunity for corrective capacity-building in the host nation in order to protect them from future “shocks.” Second, global instability will continue to pose an economic and security risk to the United States and its allies. Third, presidential administrations will continue to value “softer” solutions like stability operations as a viable power projection option.

### Significance

This research becomes increasingly important as this country continues the post-Cold War trend of intervening in areas of instability and tailors its forces to execute missions in accordance with NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.5. Identifying these *Pillars* fills

the doctrinal gap between the Principles of Joint Operations the Stability Operations Framework in FM 3-07, by accounting for the constructive nature of stability operations when compared to the destructive tendencies of the offense and defense. It also gives contextual understanding to stability operators by providing theoretical foundation for understanding how stable societies function. This enables operators to properly analyze an unstable area, deduce gaps and failings, and formulate an appropriate COA to solve the problem. More importantly, knowing how societies function allows operators to adjust plans when certain tasks fail to provide desired results, or situational dynamics change. Finally, this thesis will either validate or expose flaws in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and the DoS' *Essential Stability Operations Tasks*, USIP/PKSOI's *Guiding Principles in Stability and Reconstruction*.

### Delimitations

Social anthropological analysis contained in this thesis ranges from the beginning of the 20th Century to present. In the search for the Fundamentals of Social Stability, the critical question that leads to inclusion or exclusion is, “will the absence of this need result in an individual acting in an unstable manner in order to achieve it?” When analyzing particular group adaptations, the question for inclusion or exclusion is, “will the absence of this particular adaptation or function result in the group’s mal-adaptation to provide it, thus enabling individual needs satisfaction?”

### Limitations

There is currently a void in dedicated stability operations lessons-learned research and literature on pre-Cold War operations. In most cases, tasks we consider part of

stability operations are discussed more in context of Counterinsurgency (COIN) or “pacification.” This will force the extrapolation of those lessons learned from COIN-focused analysis in order to gleam the stability operations best practices of those particular experiences.

Additionally, comprehensive empirical data related to the root causes of conflict and instability are lacking. Most of this information falls into the theoretical realm of social science. Empirical data that does exist relates to the effects of “youth bulges” on fragile states.

### Definitions of Key Terms

The following definitions are used in this thesis:

Access: Opportunity that allows for choices leading to the gaining of skills and qualifications necessary to fulfill one’s potential. This may be physical or social.

Basic Need: Universal, irreducible, and irreplaceable requisites that an organism must have to enjoy continued, productive activity aimed at survival and successful reproduction.<sup>7</sup> Humans must fulfill these if they are to avoid sustained and serious harm.<sup>8</sup>

Drivers of Instability.<sup>§</sup> Needs (Basic and Perceived), that when left unsatisfied, will lead to individuals and groups resorting to unstable behavior in order to satisfy them. They are divided into three groups, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary

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<sup>§</sup>These “root causes” are primarily derived from theoretical research on social behavior. SDIs are backed by empirical research based on the effects of “youth bulges” and other socio-economic inequalities on society. While a large volume of comprehensive empirical data has yet to emerge, it is critical to prioritize area of focus for “first-response” stability operators in post-conflict areas.

Primary Drivers of Instability (PDI) are a failure to satisfy the Individual Basic Needs of Air, Food, Water, Thermoregulation,<sup>9</sup> Physical Safety, and Medical care. If not met immediately, such voids will cause personnel to react in an unstable manner in order to achieve fulfillment and avoid harm.<sup>10</sup>

Secondary Drivers (SDI) are a failure to satisfy the Individual Basic Needs of Social Freedoms, Social Participation, and Physiological and Economic Safety. If not met in a timely fashion, such voids will cause personnel to react in an unstable manner in order to achieve fulfillment.<sup>11</sup>

Tertiary Drivers (TDI) are a failure to satisfy Perceived Needs or wants.<sup>12</sup> If not eventually addressed or discredited, such voids will cause personnel to react in an unstable manner in order to achieve fulfillment.

Fundamentals of Social Stability: Individual needs common to all humans, as well as the institutions and functions societies create to ensure those needs are met. These are common to every person and society, regardless of demographics.

Harm: Disabling effects that inhibit new achievements which would have otherwise been possible.<sup>13</sup> This can be physical, mental, or financial.

Medical care: the preventative or reactive addressing of health-related issues by a medical specialist. This may be primitive, in terms of a village medicine man, or advanced, in the form of a formally-educated doctor.

Mobility: \*\* A person's ability to move about the social spectrum and participate commensurate with the potential they see themselves as possessing. This does not

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\*\*Most social anthropologists refer to *mobility* as a critical element to the human existence, though in doing so, they use the term in different ways. Malinowski refers to it

necessarily imply they possess capable skills, as a person may believe they have the potential, but lack the access to gain the training and skills that come from such mentoring.

Nation-Building: The use of the elements of national power to transform a society from one of conflict and instability into one of prosperity, in peace with itself and its neighbors.<sup>14</sup> Critical to this process is the cultivation of a common national identity.<sup>15</sup>

Pacification Operations: Actions taken to win the “hearts and minds” of a population, typically linked to constructive societal capacity building and destructive actions against enemy forces.

Pillars of Stability Operations: Conditions and functions essential to unique execution of stability operations. These nest between the Joint Operational Principles from JP 3-0 and the Stability Operations Framework in FM 3-07 and account for the constructive nature of stability operations.

Reproduction and Training of New Members: An economic cycle generating future needs-satisfier producers that begins with ovulation, continues through birth and socialization, and ends when offspring are no longer dependent on others for survival.<sup>16</sup>

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as “activity which is necessary to the organism as it is indispensable to culture,” while focusing on the frequency in which members obtain exercise and initiative in action. Braybrooke mentions the importance of exercise in reference to health and how it maintains the efficient operation of the body. Corning refers to it partially in a sense that emphasizes exercise as important to the efficient functioning of the organism and partially as it relates to the technological advances that allow greater access and efficiency in life, such as vehicles, trains, etc. For purposes of this study, *movement*, as it relates to the betterment or maintenance of a person’s health, is better included under preventative and curative *medical care*, as it relates to a person’s health, which we consider a start point for a person’s participation in society. In other words, you either have good health, which is a prerequisite for access to the full range of societal participation, or you don’t and are thus limited in your possibilities for action.

Safety: Freedom from the occurrence or risk of injury, danger, or loss.<sup>17</sup>

Satisfier: A resource that directly fulfills a need. For example, an apple directly fulfills the need for food.

Security: Freedom from care, anxiety, or doubt of physical or financial safety.<sup>18</sup>

Freedom from such anxiety is gained when a credible and reliable element provides this safety, an individual provides it for themselves.

Smart Practices: Actions, processes, and theories undertaken to counteract the tendency of organizational systems to perform poorly during circumstances that require their efficient adaptation.<sup>19</sup>

Social Control: Comprised of Essential Elements and Enablers, it is the legitimate and effective governing of all aspects of the *Group Fulfillment Adaptations*.

Social Participation:<sup>††</sup> The exercising of relationships that serves as a precondition for the gathering information, personal growth, and group acceptance.

Specialization: The choice individuals make to focus on one area of employment in order to earn sufficient wages that enable the procurement of resources that fulfill basic needs. An example is a community blacksmith who produces finished iron goods in exchange for wages (in the form of money or other finished goods). These allow him to exchange for other needs-fulfilling goods and services. Someone who does not specialize spreads their effort and energy across all areas of needs-satisfier production to self-

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<sup>††</sup>The five theorists in Figure 3 have various entries regarding the importance of individual socialization within a society. All recognized the importance of a person receiving recognition and acceptance from others. Additionally, they acknowledge an individual's need for information in order to allow for personal growth.

produce resources that will fulfill their basic needs, often at the expense of efficiency and overall productivity.

Stability Operations: (JP 3-0) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.<sup>20</sup>

Stabilization: The act of addressing underlying causes that lead to armed violence and a breakdown of law and order.<sup>21</sup> Methods employed are done so with long-term vision to ensure sustainable solutions are implemented.

Stable: An absence of armed conflict with hostilities terminated and peace consolidated.<sup>22</sup>

State Building: Creating a functional government, comprised of capable institutions and organizations, that can provide security and basic services to the population.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Richard F. Rinaldo, “Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Winter 1996-7): 111-2.

<sup>2</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006, Incorporating Change 1, 2008), iii.

<sup>3</sup>Gian P. Gentile, “The Selective Use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Army History*, no. 72 (Summer 2009): 21-22.

<sup>4</sup>The United States Army, *The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2009), xix-xx.

<sup>5</sup>United States Institute for Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C., Endowment of the United States Institute for Peace, 2009), 1-3, 2-9.

<sup>6</sup>Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 39.

<sup>7</sup>Dr. Peter A. Corning, “Biological Adaptations in Human Societies: A ‘Basic Needs’ Approach,” *Journal of Bioeconomics* 2 (2000): 60-62.

<sup>8</sup>Len Doyal and Ian Gough, *A Theory of Human Need* (New York: The Guilford Press: 1991), 50.

<sup>9</sup>Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 372.

<sup>10</sup>The United States Army and The United States Marine Corps, *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 98.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Corning, *Biological Adaptation in Human Societies: A ‘Basic Needs’ Approach*, 62.

<sup>13</sup>Len Doyal and Ian Gough, *A Theory of Human Need* (New York: The Guilford Press: 1991), 51.

<sup>14</sup>James Dobbins et al., *The Beginners Guide to Nation Building* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), xvii.

<sup>15</sup>Donald E. Klingner and L. R. Jones, “Learning from the Philippine Occupation: Nation-building and Institutional Development in Iraq and Other High Security Risk Nations,” *Public Administration and Development* 25, no. 2 (2005): 152.

<sup>16</sup>Doyal and Gough, 83.

<sup>17</sup>Dictionary.com, “safety,” <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/safety> (accessed June 12, 2009).

<sup>18</sup>Dictionary.com, “security,” <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/security> (accessed June 12, 2009).

<sup>19</sup>Klingner and Jones, 146.

<sup>20</sup>Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, GP-25.

<sup>21</sup>The United States Army, *The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual*, Glossary-15.

<sup>22</sup>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience,” *Journal on Development* 9, no. 3 (2008): 13.

<sup>23</sup>Klingner and Jones, 152.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The information in this chapter shows how important works contribute to the development of the Fundamentals of Social Stability, Smart Practices of Stability Operations, and the Pillars of Stability Operations.

#### Government Documents

NSPD-44 of 2005 recognized the importance of USG involvement in unstable areas and formally tasked DoD and DoS to coordinate their efforts<sup>1</sup> in this area to maximize effects. Additionally, it established DoS, specifically the Department of State/Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), as the lead agency for ally stability-related activities abroad.<sup>2</sup> This document propelled stability operations to the status of core mission, rather than an afterthought in military planning.

In 2005, the release of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.5 officially tasked military forces with the responsibility to conduct and support stability operations.<sup>3</sup> DoDD 3000.5 placed additional emphasis with, “They [stability operations] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including, doctrine, organizations, training, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”<sup>4</sup>

#### Field Manuals and Related Works

Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*, provides common doctrine for the conduct of operations at the combatant command, joint task force, sub-unified command, and interagency levels.<sup>5</sup> It applies to all operations along the Spectrum of Conflict. Current

joint doctrine now lists twelve *Principles of Joint Operations*,<sup>6</sup> combining the former Principles of War and Principles of MOOTW in 2001.

The U.S. Army's 2008 revision of FM 3-0, *Operations*, ushered in the concept of "Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO)."<sup>7</sup> This manual represents how the Army has adapted during this decade to meet operational demands. FSO accounts for the need of near-simultaneity in the execution of operations in complex environments. Based on the changes made in JP 3-0 in 2001, FM 3-0 now lists the compiled Principles of Joint Operations. These govern the conduct of all four operations under the FSO concept.

FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* represents a new collaborative approach to doctrine development. This manual was written with the inclusive help of many interagency and non-governmental organization personnel, as opposed to solely written by the military. The population-centered approach derives its roots from many contemporary lessons, most notably the British in Malaya and David Galula's opinions on French Counterinsurgency.<sup>8</sup> Obviously developed and written to address the ongoing operations, *Counterinsurgency* incorporates successful techniques taken from historical operations for contemporary use. However, this historical bias may not enjoy application across demographics.

The Army's FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, like FM 3-24, reflects increased cooperation between military, interagency, and non-governmental organization personnel. This manual provides a historical background for why the United States engages in stability operations. It then moves to how stability operations exists inside the Full Spectrum of Operations. FM 3-07 dedicates the majority of the manual to the Department of State Post-conflict Essential Security Tasks, the Department of Defense

Primary Stability Tasks, and how to plan and execute operations based off these frameworks. In its lineage, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* evolves directly from experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, as well as lessons learned while training stability operations forces at the Army's training centers in Germany and Louisiana. It possesses little theoretical basis.<sup>9</sup> Like FM 3-24, this predisposes historical bias (knowingly or unknowingly) in the implementation of this doctrine, as the frameworks, tasks, and endstates contained within it may not apply across all demographics.

The United States Army's PKSOI, in collaboration with USIP, published *Guiding Principles of Stability and Reconstruction* in 2009 as a common doctrine for all civilian practitioners of stability operations. Like FM 3-07, *Guiding Principles* is derived from recent historical experience<sup>10</sup> instead of social science theory. The manual presents the doctrine as “Cross-cutting Principles” for stability and reconstruction operations. Each principle is then broken down into “endstates” that further contain “conditions” that lead to their respective accomplishment.

Richard J. Rinaldo's *Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers do MOOTW?* compares existing doctrine from 1996 that relates to stability and reconstruction operations, specifically the “Principles of War” from JP 3-0 and the “Principles of MOOTW” from FM 100-23. He argues that both have commonalities, as evidenced by their appreciation for the principles of *Objective* and *Security*. Additionally, the other principles that appear to diverge actually have application across what is now known as the “Full Spectrum” of operations.<sup>11</sup> This leads the author to suggest that a subsequent doctrinal rewrite compile the two existing sets of principles into one,<sup>12</sup> which occurred with the 10 September 2001 update to JP 3-0.<sup>13</sup>

## Fundamentals of Social Stability

While the concept of Basic Needs is widely written about, surprisingly little actually explains what the specific needs are. Of the experts in this area, there are two main groups. The first comes from the social anthropological school of Functionalism, while the second group resides in the contemporary global development theory. This section focuses on works within the Functionalist movement, as they identify individual needs and the mechanisms societies develop to fulfill those needs. Global development focuses on how to best meet the needs of individuals and groups living in squalor, and will be discussed at the end of this chapter under Global Development Theory.

Figure 3 shows a synopsis of five of the major works that attempt to explain individual basic needs.<sup>7</sup> While the range of works spans the 20th Century, each provides vital information that answers the question of what an individual's basic needs are. However, no one list serves as a "Rosetta Stone." The various writers have disagreements regarding what truly constitutes a "need," as opposed to what only contributes to the fulfillment of such needs and is thus incorrectly labeled. More important than their disagreement on categorization, these sociologists and scientists do recognize many of the same needs, wants, and desires, regardless of their chosen naming conventions. This loose consensus allows us to derive a list of truly important needs and functions, while accepting that those of a more academic stature may argue whether our labeling is correct or not. For stability operators, regardless of the naming methodology, basic needs and

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<sup>7</sup>Of these experts, only Bronislaw Malinowski and Len Doyal and Ian Gough go further to specify what functions societies must implement to ensure individuals can meet these needs. The others speculate on this in the course of explaining individual basic needs.

those desires closely connected to needs fulfillment must be identified and addressed.

Below is a brief synopsis of each theorist's major work on the subject of Basic Needs:

Dr. David Braybrooke's 1987 publication of *Meeting Needs* lists his "Matters of Need," which must be met "in order for life and normative functioning to continue."<sup>14</sup> The first group relates to physical functioning, while the second group relates more to social functioning.<sup>15</sup> Braybrooke's main contribution to this thesis relates to the role governments play in needs-satisfaction. In short, Braybrooke believed that public policy existed to ensure needs-satisfaction, that rules were required to enable public policy to do so, and that these rules needed to establish individual and collective rights.<sup>16</sup>

Dr. Peter A. Corning contributed two works to this thesis. The first, *Biological Adaptations in Human Societies: A Basic Needs Approach*, was printed in 2000. This work theorizes on basic needs by synthesizing the works of Malinowski, Abraham Maslow, Doyal and Gough, and Amartya Kumar Sen. This piece elaborates on the above theorists' concepts, and further conceptualizes basic needs by breaking them down to five related categories. Of these five, the concept of "Primary Needs Domains"<sup>17</sup> is the most appropriate for this study, and is listed in figure 3. Corning calls Primary Needs Domains "A requisite for which the lack of would have serious potential to do 'harm.' They are universal, irreducible and non-substitutable."<sup>18</sup> Corning argues that an organism's successful adaptation through the various stages of life is a direct consequence of meeting these fourteen needs. A failure to do so results in harm. Corning's 2005 publication of *Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, Cybernetics and the Bioeconomics of Evolution*, provides a far more expansive study of behavior, much of which does not relate to this study.

However, he does further elaborate on the “Primary Needs Domains,” going into deeper detail on the concepts he introduces in *Biological Adaptations*.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to consensus on many of the core individual basic needs, Dr. Corning’s works contribute three major themes to this study. The first is the concept of Thermoregulation, or the process by which the body regulates its internal temperature.<sup>20</sup> The second is his concept of *Perceived Needs*, which are wants and desires that an individual thinks are essential to their ability to live, but are not physiologically critical.<sup>21</sup> The final theme is Corning’s argument that *health* is a relative starting point or prerequisite in an individual’s pursuit of basic needs, because it is a by-product of other needs being fulfilled.<sup>22</sup> Such fulfillment of needs would not be possible unless one had a reasonable amount of good health in the first place, or someone else procured and prepared those resources for them. This idea leaves the inclusion of *health*, as opposed to other needs whose fulfillment lead to one achieving relative health, open to debate on which needs are truly basic, or just byproducts of needs-fulfillment.

Len Doyal and Ian Gough produced *A Theory of Human Need* in 1991. While the book goes into vast detail regarding the concept of needs and how it relates to the social sciences, a good amount of the information in *A Theory of Human Need* is also discussed by the other theorists, with disagreement over the labeling of particular categories. Doyal and Gough argue that “health” and “autonomy” are the two basic needs of individuals,<sup>23</sup> while resources like food and water are termed as “Intermediate Needs” because meeting these needs contributes to the endstate of “health.<sup>24</sup> In this case, both the basic and intermediate needs are important. However, Doyal and Gough choose to establish a hierarchy, much in the same fashion Maslow does in his *A Theory of Human Motivation*.

Regardless, as discussed above, this thesis is more interested in the collective group of needs identified as important to normative life, rather than their categorization or ranking.

Doyal and Gough's main contribution to this thesis lies in their concepts of *harm* and *autonomy*. *Harm* is critical to this study because it defines what will happen to an individual when they do not have their needs fulfilled, regardless of the means by which they choose to do so.<sup>25</sup> Their concept of "autonomy" is better termed as precondition for participation in life. A lack of any aspect of the autonomy will result in an organism experiencing serious disablement.<sup>26</sup> For this thesis, harm and autonomy are better viewed in terms of health, which we consider a precondition for an individual's ability to satisfy basic needs. As stated in Chapter 1, *health* is an absence of *harm*, while the portion of Doyal and Gough's *autonomy* related mental and cognitive capacity<sup>27</sup> is also included in the baseline requirement of *health*. Other aspects of autonomy which relate to a person's ability to make choices and pursue them<sup>28</sup> are encompassed in the basic need of "Social Freedoms" in figure 3.

Dr. Bronislaw Malinowski's *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* was published in 1960, and is based on his observation of primitive tribes in Micronesia. It describes what an individual's basic needs are, other "derived" needs that arise out of the quest to fulfill basic needs, and how culture adapts to ensure needs-fulfillment.

Important to this thesis is Malinowski's *Metabolism*<sup>29</sup> concept, or how the body ensures physiological health through ingesting, digesting, and excreting resources. Additionally important is the theory of *Commissariat*, one of the adaptations that cultures go through to ensure needs-fulfillment. In this case, the *Commissariat* ensures a ready supply of food and other physiologically-important resources.<sup>30</sup> Finally, Malinowski's

belief that health is a prerequisite for basic needs satisfaction<sup>31</sup> (as Corning does), also contributes to this thesis' view of health.

Dr. Abraham H. Maslow published his “Hierarchy of Needs” in *A Theory of Human Motivation*. In it, he details the five levels of human need and the order in which an individual is likely to fulfill them.<sup>32</sup> One principal drawback to this work is the lack of empirical research in his findings,<sup>33</sup> leading some critics to question its validity. However, Maslow’s Hierarchy impacts this thesis by defining the prioritization of an individual’s basic needs fulfillment. This defines parameters for when unstable behavior may begin in the absence of needs-fulfilling resources or the satisfaction of basic needs themselves, which in turn defines priorities for stability operators.

### Smart Practices of Stability Operations

#### The Philippine Insurrection

The stability operations experience during the Philippine Insurrection is analogous to the American involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both started as a regime change, experienced a short operational lull after the fall of the previous governing power, then quickly transitioned to a counterinsurgency. The American involvement in the Philippines was hotly contested domestically by anti-imperialists, while many in the United States opposed the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Both experiences involved a mid-operation presidential election closely watched by insurgent leadership. Finally, both operations clearly demonstrate a number of “how to” as well as “what not to do” for future stability operations.

In their 2004 piece, *Learning from the Philippine Occupation: Nation-Building and other Institutional Development in Iraq and other High Security Risk Nations*,

Donald E. Klingner and L. R. Jones make an argument for the importance of studying historical stability operations. They first list-out what pre-invasion plans existed for rebuilding Iraq in 2003, and how those plans evolved through the first year.<sup>34</sup> They then discuss the after-effects the end of the Cold War had on American foreign policy, specifically the increase in U.S. humanitarian and stability operations.<sup>35</sup> Finally, they discuss the factors that led to the Spanish American War and the subsequent stability operations in both the Caribbean (Cuba and Puerto Rico) and the Philippines.<sup>36</sup> The paper concludes with a list of lessons learned for contemporary stability operations.<sup>37</sup>

Three portions of *Learning from the Philippine Occupation* are important to this thesis. The first is the discretion applied to using and applying “best practices” from other stability operations, which the authors argue are demographically specific, and do not apply everywhere.<sup>38</sup> Such focus blinds leaders to real causes and solutions pertinent to a particular situation. Instead, Klingner and Jones argue for the use of “Smart Practices.” This focuses more on the mechanisms and processes that counteract the tendency of public sector political, organizational, and technical systems to perform unsatisfactory while adapting during volatile periods,<sup>39</sup> which requires an understanding of social science. These Smart Practices focus on gleaming lessons from previous historical experiences and adjusting them to the specific contexts of contemporary operations; this includes the exclusion of previously successful practices that may not apply to a specific situation.<sup>40</sup> In short, the difference between “Best Practices” and “Smart Practices” is perspective. The previous is focused on solution analysis while the latter is focused on problem analysis.

The second important theme is the definitions applied to the terms “Nation-building” and “State-building,” noted in chapter 1 of this thesis. In short, Nation-building is a long-duration (decades) operation that focuses on building stability by changing culture and forging a national identity amongst the population. Conversely, State-building is a short-duration (years) operation that focuses on building stability through leveraging existing institutions.<sup>41</sup> When comparing the two to contemporary operations, the previous is a “Best Practice,” where the latter is a “Smart Practice” and more applicable, given the resources and time available to America and its allies. The final take-away is the importance of correctly timing “transitions” from an intervening authority to an indigenous authority, with the changes in resources that accompany such moves. Failure to correctly time the withdrawal of security, advisory, or economic resources will increase the likelihood of subsequent infighting amongst competing entities when to dominating faction departs the area.<sup>42</sup>

Robert D. Ramsey III produced two extensive works through the Combat Studies Institute (CSI). The first is *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, while the second is *A Masterpiece of Counterguerilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902*. In *Savage Wars*, Ramsey focuses on four major themes, in the chronological order in which they occurred. The first is the initial strategy of “Benevolent Assimilation / Pacification”<sup>43</sup> under Major General Elwell S. Otis, who was the first military governor of the islands. This was a combination of paternal ideals developed by Otis while fighting Plains Indians,<sup>44</sup> and more progressive ideals emerging in the United States. The second theme focuses on the strategic shift that took place when Otis was replaced by the “whole of government” team of William H.

Taft and General Arthur MacArthur. Using Otis' stability-driven tactics as a method to attack insurgent infrastructure,<sup>45</sup> they brought pressure on the Filipino Insurrectos by denying them access to population centers and food.<sup>46</sup> The third theme focuses on the post-election surge that followed William McKinley's presidential reelection in 1902. The dashed Insurrecto hopes of an American "regime change" resulted in increased surrenders and decreased attacks.<sup>47</sup> MacArthur and Taft took this as an opportunity to increase pressure on the Insurrectos and further develop the societal infrastructure necessary to establish a stable Philippines.<sup>48</sup> The final theme in Ramsey's *Savage Wars* details J. Franklin Bell's pacification campaign.<sup>49</sup> Ramsey gives further detail to Bell in *A Masterpiece*, where he presents Bell's telegraphic circulars to his forces. These communications show a commander driven to ensure his forces act with restraint<sup>50</sup> and understand that filling the void of governance is as important as defeating the enemy.<sup>51</sup> Included in this piece is Bell's description of what his concept of operations is,<sup>52</sup> which demonstrates an understanding of the importance of population protection and control in defeating an insurgent force. *A Masterpiece* concludes with the various communiqués sent by Bell to his subordinates and to the population, as well as detailed indexing of all telegraphed guidance.<sup>53</sup>

Max Boot's *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* surveys the American experience in counterinsurgencies. The book devotes a significant amount of volume to the experience in the Philippines by detailing U.S. actions from the defeat of the Spanish,<sup>54</sup> through General Otis' initial policy of "Benevolent Assimilation,"<sup>55</sup> to the decisive establishment of "Zones of Attraction / Protection" under Taft and General Arthur MacArthur.<sup>56</sup> This book provides broad

information on how U.S. military forces ensured popular needs satisfaction, allowing for more detailed research elsewhere.

Dr. Charles Byler's 2005 work, *Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913*, details the pacification campaign in the Philippines shortly after the defeat of the Spanish in 1899. What distinguishes this work from others used in the research of this thesis is the documentation of further pacification efforts under Major General Leonard Wood and Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, and Brigadier General John J. Pershing. This information provides insight into the "dividends" yielded by the various pacification approaches in the decade that followed the defeat of the Spanish.

#### Vietnam

The study of needs in the Vietnam War starts with the status of South Vietnamese needs-fulfillment in the wake of the Tet Offensive, and how the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) addressed this through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The following articles mentioned below contribute to this analysis.

Dale Andrade and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army published "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future" in the March-April 2006 issues of *Military Review*. This paper provides in-depth detail on the various events that led to the development of CORDS, as well as the Phoenix program that resided under it.

Major Gordon M. Wells published "No More Vietnams: CORDS as a Model for Counterinsurgency Campaign Design" as a monograph for the U.S. Army's School of

Advanced Military Studies in 1991. This paper describes the aims of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, and how pacification in South Vietnam adapted to counter their actions. It concludes with a prediction (that was farsighted, given the recent U.S. military success in Southwest Asia) that insurgency will be the America's biggest threat in years to come, and that CORDS is a successful model for fighting it.

John Albert Graham wrote “Afghanistan-Winning Lessons From Vietnam” for the *American Chronicle* on 18 October 2009. This article is based on his personal experiences as a USAID worker in Vietnam under the CORDS program. It illuminated the difficulties encountered in a counterinsurgency when a population becomes disillusioned with government corruption.

In the April, 1971 issue of *Asian Survey*, Buu Hoan published “The South Vietnamese Economy in the Transition to Peace and After.” This document describes the challenges South Vietnam faced as the United States continued its policy of Vietnamization. This paper focuses on the economic effects of the departure of U.S. forces, civilian personnel, and aid, and provides insight into the “Dutch Disease” caused by such large presence in a small economic system.

Matthew D. Pinard’s graduate thesis “The American and South Vietnamese Pacification Efforts During the Vietnam War,” through Louisiana State University, provides insight into the pacification programs that preceded the implementation of CORDS. It also details the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) that was run by CORDS following the 1968 Tet Offensive. The paper concludes with the effects of pacification, as a whole, on South Vietnam.

The Rand Corporation's Victoria Pohle published "The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive" in January 1969. This piece is a compilation of field work conducted in Saigon and the surrounding districts in the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Through detailed surveys, Pohle provides an in-depth analysis of Viet Cong aims and methods during Tet.

In 2006, Combat Studies Institute (CSI) published *Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives*. This compilation consists of the proceedings and associated articles from CSI's 2006 Military History Symposium. One of the works contained in this book is Dr. Richard W. Stewart's "CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification." This manuscript documents the development of CORDS and illuminates specific measures of effectiveness between 1968 and 1972. It concludes with lessons learned from CORDS that are applicable in contemporary operations.

William P. Schoux's "The Vietnam Experience: A Model of Successful Civil-Military Partnership" was actually written for USAID with the intent to influence contemporary integration of its civilians with military forces on the battlefield.<sup>57</sup> This document provides background on various pacification programs in Vietnam and CORDS, as well as in-depth analysis on the Accelerated Pacification Campaign after Tet.

In 2004, The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) hosted a military symposium at Fort Leavenworth titled, *Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign*. Contained in their compilation of the works presented at the symposium is Dr. James H. Willbanks' "Vietnamization: An Incomplete Exit Strategy." This article provides in-depth analysis in the campaign that facilitated the U.S. withdrawal from

South Vietnam, and is useful to this thesis in illuminating the long-term effectiveness of the CORDS program.

Max Boot's "Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power" provides a portion on the Vietnam and the pacification efforts undertaken there. It details the CORDS program, as well as the Marine Corps' Combined Action Program (CAP).

In 2004, Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill of the Strategic Studies Institute published "Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights." This piece compares the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Vietnam, but particularly adds to this thesis in its documentation of the effects of Vietnamization and how that combined with the Vietnamese Government's (GVN) ineptitude to propel South Vietnam to collapse in 1975.

### Somalia

This thesis focuses on the actions of clan-based society in South-Central Somalia between 1995 and 2006. This illuminates how a "stateless" society<sup>8</sup> established relative order through leveraging traditional forms of society in order to ensure FSS fulfillment. This portion of the study is analogous to the situation in Afghanistan, as both countries are largely agrarian, pastoral, and rural, with layers of social control that exist through tribes/clans, warlords, and a weak central government. Interestingly, the works mentioned below from human rights perspectives talk despairingly about the situation in Somalia, where those that focus on stateless economics have a more favorable outlook.

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<sup>8</sup>This thesis excludes the study of Puntland and Somaliland, as they established state-like regimes after the Somali Civil War.

In 2004, Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, and Lieutenant Colonel Versalle F. Washington, U. S. Army, published “*My Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994*” through the Combat Studies Institute (CSI). This provides background information on the demise of the Said Barre military dictatorship that resulted in the warlord and clan infighting of the early 1990s. Additionally important to this thesis is the information it provides about FSS depravities and methods used to fulfill them.

Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh produced *Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?* through The Independent Institute in 2006. This document provides significant information surrounding the “prosperity” Somalia experienced after the end of the Somalia Civil War. It also provides significant data, based on eighteen indicators of prosperity measurement for how to gauge the effects of social control on a pastoral society.

Peter T. Leeson’s *Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse* provides insight into how a corrupt government stunted the Somali economy, and how the removal of that government from power allowed for various sectors of the economy to grow. Additionally, the information used to propel the author’s argument is useful in identifying levels of needs-fulfillment under the corrupt Barre regime, the warlords and clans who inherited control of the remnants of Somalia, and the attempts at reestablishing a central government after 2000.

The Danish Immigration Service published *Human rights and security in central and southern Somalia* in 2004, after a fact-finding mission to Kenya. This document provides contextual background to some of the challenges that face the security,

education, and trade environments in south and central Somalia, as well as the evolution of these problems since the end of the Somali Civil War.

Daniel K. Leonard of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) published *Recreating Political Order: The Somali Systems Today* in January, 2009. In this work, he highlights the various social structures that survived the military dictatorship under Said Barre only to emerge as the only capable elements of control left in Somalia after the departure of United Nations forces in 1995. He also describes the cultural laws and systems that enable clans to control respective areas and how Somali society has adjusted under them and averted chaos after the fall of the Somali state.

Bjorn Moller of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) wrote *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors* in 2009. This body of work provides contextual background to this thesis regarding the various elements of social control from the Barre government, through the warlords and clans of the 1990s, to the attempts at a central government in this decade.

Joakim Gundel of the Danish Refugee Council published *The Predicament of the 'Oday'* in 2006. This report relates to this thesis by illuminating how clans and their elders provide structure to Somali society, and some of the challenges to this authority in

### Hamas

The study of Hamas provides a parallel view of how a subversive organization can usurp power and consolidate its new authority by focusing on the Fundamentals of Social Stability.

In *Hamas 2.0*, Michael Broning writes about the evolution of Hamas from a terrorist organization to one that won legitimate power through democratic elections. In

it, he details how Hamas moved away from their anti-Israeli rhetoric to one focused on the reunification of Palestine.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, this “softened” platform, developed in preparation for the 2006 elections, focused the outward image of the organization on their social work, rather than their attacks against Israel.<sup>59</sup> Broning then describes how Hamas approached needs-fulfillment of the Gaza population after they seized control, along with some of the drawbacks of being ruled by a fundamentalist organization with terrorist roots.

Micheal Keene’s *Social Justice Initiatives as a Legitimizing Force as Seen in Hamas and Hezbollah* describes how both organizations trace the roots of their social programs back to the Muslim Brotherhood and the works of Sayyid Qutb.<sup>60</sup> The piece goes on to detail how each group used approaches focused on fulfilling basic needs of the public to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the overall Muslim community in the Middle East.

Colonel Ben-Zion Mehr (Israeli Defense Force) wrote *Hamas – How Has a Terrorist Organization Become a Political Power?* as a Strategy Research Project for the U.S. Army War College in 2008. This paper traces the evolution of Hamas’ operational balance between terrorist and social justice activities and describes how Hamas shifted their focus of effort to the actions of their social wing in advance of the 2006 elections. It concludes with recommendations on how to combat Hamas’ growing power, focusing on propping up Fatah more than combating Hamas, as the latter will likely be viewed by the Muslim population as being opposition to Islam more than opposition to terrorism.

The Brookings Institute recently produced a piece by Martin S. Indyk of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy titled, *Governing Gaza: Hamas’ Dilemma*. In it,

Indyk quickly provides background on how Hamas rose to power, then moves on to the problems they currently face in governing the area.<sup>61</sup> Most importantly, he details the issues they face with social control, the economy, inflation, fulfilling basic needs of the population, and diplomatic relations with Egypt and Israel.<sup>62</sup>

#### International Aid Community Strategy in Gaza

Analyzing the international development community in Gaza in the wake of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 provides a different perspective on how a non-state, unarmed community focuses on the fulfillment of individual basic needs.

Sorcha O'Callaghan, Suzanne Jaspars, and Sara Pavanello of the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) recently produced *Losing Ground: Protection and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. This document provides detailed background on need deprivations faced by Palestinians in Gaza from the Second Intifada until the rise of Hamas.<sup>63</sup> It also lends analysis on the deprivations endured by Palestinians currently living in Gaza and the West Bank,<sup>64</sup> and is especially useful in understanding the challenges Hamas' government faces as it attempts to control Gaza. Additionally, the inability for the Gaza government to effect certain portions of the region after Operation Cast Lead in early 2009 provides detailed understanding of how aid organizations carry-out measures to fulfill gaps in needs satisfaction.<sup>65</sup>

The International Crisis Group's (ICG) *Gaza's Unfinished Business* provides detailed observation from primary sources on the effects of Operation Cast Lead on Gazans' ability to meet their basic needs.<sup>66</sup> It outlines the challenges that Hamas and the international response community face as they try to reconstruct Gaza in the aftermath of war with Israel.<sup>67</sup>

## Compilations

LTC David P. Cavaleri's Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War On Terror (GWOT) Occasional Paper (OP) 1, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations* focuses on filling the gaps between stability operations doctrine and TTP manuals.<sup>68</sup> In it, the author obviates doctrinal linkage between JP 3-0, FM 3-0, and FM 3-07. From this analysis, he details a list of "Transitional Planning Themes" for use in stability operations. These are: Legitimacy, Security, Commitment, Situational Understanding, Unity of Effort, Infrastructure, Economic Status, Planning Effort, and Media.<sup>69</sup> He uses the occupation of Japan after World War II as the vehicle to analyze the planning themes and show lessons analogous to current operations in Iraq. However, as noted in chapter 1 of this thesis, the Japanese occupation lacks application to current operations as it did not have an active insurgency, and the population generally supported the provisional government under MacArthur. Regardless, the "Transitional Planning Themes" do have some validity to this study, specifically the areas of Legitimacy, Security, Infrastructure, Economic Status, and Media. The others are better viewed as screening criteria, as they need to be included in any operation, regardless of where it lies on the spectrum of conflict.

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, wrote *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency* as an attempt to identify what common trends certain intervening forces do well, and what trends they execute to their detriment. In it, he lists and details these practices. The majority of the article is, in keeping with its title, of better use in studying the specifics of counter-insurgency (COIN). One useful portion of Dr. Sepp's *Successful Operational Practices* is

his argument that providing for basic needs and human rights of the population. He stipulates this is essential to any COIN effort's ability to gain support of the population.<sup>70</sup>

The Rand Corporation's James Dobbins, in coordination with Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse published *The Beginners Guide to Nation Building* in 2007. This book compiles sixteen previous Rand studies, mostly headed by Mr. Dobbins. These were originally packaged as a comprehensive history of nation-building by the United States (published in 2003) and the United Nations (published in 2005). The *Guide* roots itself in the identified best practices found in each respective study.<sup>71</sup>

In 2007, Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shulka of the Rand Corporation published "Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations." This work is a compilation of various case studies, two of which are the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War. In each case study, it compares strength and weaknesses of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, how they compensated for and exploited these, and the conclusions for contemporary applicability.

### Global Development Theory

Global development strategy over the past forty years has often focused on the idea of basic needs fulfillment. The Basic Needs Approach (BNA) became popular in the mid 1970s among development practitioners, but quickly fell out of favor during the recessions of the early 1980s. Regardless, study of this approach provides insight into what an individual's basic needs are.

Kenneth A. Reinert's dissertation for George Mason University's School of Public Policy, titled *No Small Hope: The Basic Goods Imperative*, argues for a new

framework to measure development. This document compares this new approach to other previously popular approaches to development, specifically the BNA. It also provides a list of what the BNA’s “basic needs” consists of.<sup>72</sup>

*Too Poor For Peace*, a 2007 compilation of essays from the Brookings Institute, provides detailed analysis on the linkages between poverty, population demographics, and instability. Many of the essays contained within *Too Poor* detail issues related to Military Aged Males (MAMs) and the effects of youth bulges in third world nations. It also provides suggestions on how to cope with such situations, as many of the areas who fit these parameters of risk reside in areas that are currently unstable.

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<sup>1</sup>The President of the United States, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44* (7 December 2005), 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>3</sup>Department of Defense, *Directive Number 3000.5*, 28 November 2005, 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, i.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., II-2.

<sup>7</sup>The United States Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-1.

<sup>8</sup>The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps, xxiv.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., xix-xx.

<sup>10</sup>United States Institute for Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 1-3, 1-9.

<sup>11</sup>Rinaldo, 114.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 112.

<sup>13</sup>Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, iii.

<sup>14</sup>David Braybrooke, *Meeting Needs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 47.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 36.

<sup>16</sup>Susan Sherwin, “Introduction: About David Braybrooke,” in *Engaged Philosophy: Essays in Honor of David Braybrooke*, ed. Susan Sherwin and Peter Schotch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 12.

<sup>17</sup>Corning, *Biological Adaptations in Human Societies: A ‘Basic Needs’ Approach*, 61-5.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 61-2.

<sup>19</sup>Peter A. Corning, *Holistic Darwinism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 2005), 285-306.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 285-286.

<sup>21</sup>Corning, *Biological Adaptations in Human Societies: A ‘Basic Needs’ Approach*, 62.

<sup>22</sup>Corning, *Holistic Darwinism*, 289-90.

<sup>23</sup>Doyal and Gough, 54.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 191-221.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 54-55

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 60-1, 63

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 60.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 63, 66-7.

<sup>29</sup>Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1960), 91-2.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 95-99.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 93.

<sup>32</sup>Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 372-383.

<sup>33</sup>Corning, *Biological Adaptations in Human Societies: A ‘Basic Needs’ Approach*, 56.

<sup>34</sup>Klingner and Jones, 147.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 148.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 149-154.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 154.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 146.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 146-7.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 152.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 154.

<sup>43</sup>Robert D. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1901-1902*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2007, reprinted 2008), 13.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 47.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 52-3.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 55.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 57-9.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 97-102.

<sup>50</sup>Robert D. Ramsey, *A Masterpiece of Counterinsurgency Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 25 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2007), 4.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 7-9.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 25-30.

<sup>54</sup>Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 102-6.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 108-14.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 115-28.

<sup>57</sup>William P. Schoux and sponsored by USAID, “The Vietnam Experience: A Model of Successful Military-Civilian Partnership,” [http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/CORDS-Report\\_final\\_2005-09-26.pdf](http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/CORDS-Report_final_2005-09-26.pdf) (accessed 5 July 2009): 2.

<sup>58</sup>Michael Broning, “Hamas 2.0,” *Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/65204> (accessed 4 September 2009).

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Michael Keene, “Social Justice Initiatives As A Legitimizing Force As Seen In Hamas And Hezbollah,” *Rivier Academic Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 1.

<sup>61</sup>Martin S. Indyk, “Governing Gaza: Hamas’s Dilemma,” Brookings Institution, [http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0702middleeast\\_indyk.aspx?p=1](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0702middleeast_indyk.aspx?p=1) (accessed 4 September 2009).

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Suzanne Jaspars, Susan O’Callaghan, and Sara Pavanello, *Losing Ground: Protection and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2009), 33-35.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 35-6.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 37-48.

<sup>66</sup>International Crisis Group, “Gaza’s Unfinished Business,” *Middle East Report* no. 85 (23 April 2009): 1-5.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 6-10, 28-30.

<sup>68</sup>Lieutenant Colonel David P. Caviglieri, US Army (Ret), *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 7* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), v.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 13-15.

<sup>70</sup>Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, PhD, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 9.

<sup>71</sup>Dobbins et al., ix.

<sup>72</sup>Kenneth A. Reinart, “No Small Hope: The Basic Goods Imperative” (Dissertation, George Mason University School of Public Policy, 2008), 14-18.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To develop this thesis, research will focus on three primary areas: the Fundamentals of Social Stability (FSS), the Smart Practices of Stability Operations, the Pillars of Stability Operations.

The FSS are individual needs common to all humans, including the institutions and functions that societies create to ensure those needs are met. These are common to every person and society, regardless of demographics. As depicted in figure 1, the FSS are derived from the synthesis of the social science works discussed in chapter 2.




Figure 1. Fundamentals of Social Stability Methodology  
Source: Created by author.

As depicted in figure 2, once the FSS are identified, they are then used as a framework to analyze how effectively needs-satisfaction was met in each historical case study and international development strategy. We conduct this analysis to identify “fixes” applied to those particular situations, and then decide if they are still valid for contemporary application. Those fixes that do have contemporary applicability become part of the *Pillars of Stability Operations*.




Figure 2. Pillars of Stability Operations Methodology  
Source: Developed by author.

The *Pillars of Stability Operations* are conditions and functions essential to success in stability operations. They must nest in the Principles of Joint Operations, and be applicable regardless of any operational demographic. However, these pillars are applied based on analysis of what pillars are violated in a given area, which drives conflict, and what pillars are fulfilled and do not need further attention.

Historical analysis of stability operations focuses on 20th Century interventions in post-conflict societies with an active insurgency and or failed states. This excludes the post-World War II nation-building experiences in Japan and Germany.<sup>9</sup> The timeframe chosen is largely due to the development of technological, social, and political phenomenon we still live with today.

The selection of each case study provides a varied perspective on how needs were fulfilled by different intervening forces. Analysis of the Philippine Insurrection is useful due to its similarities with the recent experience in Iraq. The insurgency starting after regime change and the end of major combat operations, while the intervening force endured a mid-operation presidential election amid significant domestic opposition to the military campaign itself. The CORDS portion of the Vietnam War provides an understanding of a successful method of population-centric pacification in concert with major combat operations. The analysis of the Somali population's adjustment to prolonged instability provides understanding of how societies adapt amid crisis to ensure needs-fulfillment. Hamas' rise to power in Gaza and subsequent attempt to govern the area, amid an embargo and invasion by the Israeli Army, allows us to view how a group

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<sup>9</sup>This thesis also excluded the current experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the results of these operations are still inconclusive, and the opinions and analysis of the data vary across a wide spectrum.

intervenes from within to provide stability. Finally, analysis of the international aid community's response to the fallout from Israel's most recent invasion of Gaza allows us to view how aid organizations attempt to satisfy gaps in needs-fulfillment in the interest of achieving stability. This is unique because aid organizations have no guns or legitimate indigenous authority. The analysis of these military, organizational, and societal approaches to needs fulfillment will shed light to the common practices and goals which are essential in stability operations and applicable to contemporary implementation by western military forces.

Appropriate historical and contemporary TTPs for inclusion in the results of this study are those that satisfy voids in the FSS in the type of situations mentioned above. The critical question asked in the analysis of each historical case study is, "How were gaps in individual needs and societal functions addressed?" Answering this allows us to extrapolate enduring "fixes" for contemporary application.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Doctrine

FM 3-24 mentions basic needs, and the importance of providing for them, in many portions of the manual. Chapter 3 devotes a significant amount of information to describing aspects of society and details a list of needs that are met when one fulfills essential services; these are food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. The manual argues, “People pursue essential needs until they are met, at any cost and from any source.”<sup>1</sup> Additionally, FM 3-24 does not list what institutions and functions are common to all stable societies by enabling needs-fulfillment. However, this list of needs is not comprehensive, as history proves that unstable behavior occurs for reasons other than those listed above. While FM 3-24 frequently mentions providing for popular needs, and spends a significant amount of chapter 3 discussing aspects of society, it provides no comprehensive model for basic human needs and societal functions that apply across demographics.

FM 3-07 acknowledges the importance of basic needs fulfillment to the success of a particular operation, but not what these needs are. It does refer to “immediate humanitarian needs,”<sup>2</sup> much in the same manner as FM 3-24 refers to “essential services.” *Stability Operations* does go one step further than *Counterinsurgency* in mentioning the importance of “solutions that focus on ensuring sustainable access to these basic needs” in order to “prevent the reoccurrence of systematic failure.”<sup>3</sup> However, while *Stability Operations* does provide ideas for what the basic needs of populations are,<sup>4</sup> and begins to quantify the importance of formulating courses of action

based on meeting those needs,<sup>5</sup> the manual does not mention how “sustainable access” to critical needs-fulfilling resources should be ensured.

*Guiding Principles* contains the best attempt at obviating a detailed list of basic needs and conditions for providing for them in sections 7-10.<sup>6</sup> However, the manual fails to link together how government functions relate to and ensure individual needs fulfillment, allowing for prioritization of resources for defeating the most threatening sources of instability.

What is missing from all the above manuals is information on how to ensure the availability of critical needs-satisfying resources, and thus avoid the “reoccurrence of systematic failure.” Since, as noted in FM 3-24, a void of any of these needs will cause one to pursue them until they are filled, these are a Primary Driver of Instability (PDI), and must be addressed for success in any post-conflict situation. Therefore, stability operators must ensure unity of effort in allocating critical resources to immediately address PDIs in the wake of conflict. However, nowhere in FMs 3-24 or 3-07 is there information that details what these critical sectors are. *Guiding Principles* attempts to explain what actions must be taken to combat drivers of conflicts,<sup>7</sup> but these are not explained in a manner that allows stability operators to identify Primary, Secondary (SDI), and Tertiary Drivers of Instability (TDI), and prioritize efforts and resources to defeat them. Furthermore, in describing measures to defeat drivers of conflict, it fails to detail how societies adapt to do the same. This void in knowledge prevents stability operators from implementing far-reaching solutions that leverage societal structures and facilitate the transfer of these responsibilities and actions from intervening forces to indigenous ones.

While the information contained in all three manuals listed above provides an idea of what the basic needs of stable societies are, there remains no theoretical basis that proves these are correct. As noted in chapter 1, these three manuals are based on historical experiences, and may only be valid when applied in similar circumstances. To truly understand basic needs, institutions, and functions of stable societies, we must turn to the social science school of Functionalism. Only through this study can we understand and validate ideas of needs, functions, and societal interrelatedness that enables stability operators to identify and defeat PDIs, SDIs, and TDIs. This knowledge enables subsequent prioritization inside the massive lists of tasks associated with existing post-conflict state building doctrine.

### The Fundamentals of Social Stability

The list at the center of figure 3 synthesizes the lists of crucial needs defined by the theorists described above and provides us with the “Fundamentals of Social Stability” (FSS). These are common to all stable societies regardless of time period, geography, or other demographics and are derived from the Functionalism school of social anthropology. The FSS provide the theoretical basis currently lacking in stability operations doctrine and consist of two parts: “Individual Needs” and “Group Fulfillment Adaptations.”

Individual Needs are what an individual must access in order to survive, for the foreseeable future, within minimal quality of life parameters; examples are food, water, and shelter. When these needs are not fulfilled, an individual will adapt and satisfy them (through stable or unstable behavior), or experience harm.

Group Fulfillment Adaptations are functions and/or institutions that societies develop and maintain to allow individuals to better achieve the continual satisfaction of their basic needs, such as rule of law and security apparatus like the police and military. If a society is unable to adapt to provide these functions for its population, it will either mal-adapt to do so or its constituents choose between unstable behavior to meet their individual needs or experience harm.

The FSS are analogous to the Stability Operations Framework in FM 3-07. Like each subset of the Framework, each Fundamental and can be viewed a line of operation in course of action development. What differs the Fundamentals from the Framework is how each was derived. The FSS are derived the Functionalist study of individual needs and how societies adapt to ensure these needs are met. This rooting in social science, instead of historical specifics, focuses the FSS on needs and societal functions common to all, regardless of demographics. The Stability Operations Framework is derived from recent historical lessons learned throughout the 1990s and this decade, which predisposes their use to be appropriate only in situations that are analogous to those used in the development of the Framework itself.

This difference in foundation does not mean the Stability Operations Framework is invalid. To discount the expertise, research, and collaboration that went into the development of FM 3-07 is foolish. However, the Framework contained in Stability Operations is operationally and tactically employed by individuals with less background knowledge on the subject of needs and societies; most civil affairs personnel have not received advanced formal education in these areas. To bridge this gap in knowledge, stability operators need context and purpose to go with the tasks listed in FM 3-07. The

FSS provides this context of societal interrelatedness, allowing stability operators to understand why they need to execute particular tasks. Furthermore, social science understanding through the FSS allows them to recognize cultural and conflict uniqueness, and deviate from existing doctrine while still comprehending the end-states needed for stability. The Fundamentals of Social Stability are listed below:




Figure 3. Genesis of the Fundamentals of Social Stability

*Source:* Developed by author with information from David Braybrooke, *Meeting Needs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 36; Peter A. Corning, *Holistic Darwinism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 2005), 285-297; Len Doyal and Ian Gough, *A Theory of Human Need* (New York: The Guilford Press: 1991), 80, 157-8, 191-193; Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1960), 91, 125; Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 372-384.

## Individual Basic Needs

1-4: Air, Water, Food, Waste Elimination: When most people discuss basic needs satisfaction, these four are widely considered the most essential to the body's physiological health and survival. These are best described under Malinowski's concept of Metabolism,<sup>8</sup> which describes the process of ingesting, digesting, and excreting resources to fulfill one's physiological health needs.<sup>†††</sup> In short, without the fulfillment of these four critical needs, an organism will cease to exist. Furthermore, if resources that meet these needs are consumed in an unsanitary state, or the materiel ingested is of poor quality, the human will likely live in a degraded condition. In this case, they will be unable to sustain themselves, let alone reproduce, nurture, and provide for the basic needs of offspring or others they are responsible for. Ideally, resources that fulfill the first three areas are available and consumed in such a way that ensures their availability for future use. Absence of such resources undermines and exposes weakness in social structures,<sup>9</sup> as this demonstrates the leadership's inability to ensure resource availability for individual need satisfaction. This resource scarcity results in violence, instability, a failure to satisfy basic needs, and the eventual collapse of the entire social system unless the population mobilizes to secure enough materials to stave off disaster. Individuals may take action to access these critical resources, including joining subversive elements, migrating to areas of resource abundance (which usually results in conflict with natives who don't want additional competition), or moving to urban areas in search of work (leaving them poor and vulnerable to extremist rhetoric or other criminal activity).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>††</sup>Some may also add shelter, but that is covered under *Thermoregulation* since the Commissariat only refers to the process of ingesting, digesting, and excreting resources critical to the normative function of the body.

**5. Thermoregulation:** Dr. Peter Corning's concept best describes the human need for maintenance of a near constant bodily temperature in order to achieve optimum performance levels. It maintains that every organism must fulfill this vital need, or experience a degradation of capabilities, and possibly death. The goal of 98.6 degrees is not climate dependent.<sup>11</sup> Those who live in the Tropics utilize air circulation, shade, and cool water to regulate body temperature while those in the Arctic use layered clothing, sunlight, shelter, and hot food.

**6. Safety:** A functional society safeguards its members from threats and events that harm the individual to the point where they can no longer pursue the fulfillment of their basic needs. The five theories in figure 3 encompass wide and varying concepts regarding safety, from physical to economic. To ensure completeness, safety needs are divided into four sub-sets: Physical, Emotional, Spiritual, and Economic.

We usually think of Physical Safety in terms of protection from human versus human attack, or animal versus human.<sup>12</sup> However, physical safety also includes protection from pest, disease, and environmental (man-made and natural) hazards. Mitigations include physical structures like housing that allows for proper sanitation, ventilation, and protection from other external risks,<sup>13</sup> or rules that protect workers from industrial hazards in the workplace.

Emotional Safety is jeopardized by initial deficiencies in proper nurturing and subsequent emotional impacts. These have huge ramifications on societal stability. Those who have such voids in their life will search for fulfillment of these critical needs (routine, mentorship, guidance, acceptance, etc.) until they find it,<sup>14</sup> regardless of how culturally acceptable the method of fulfillment is. One prime example is how well

children from unstable upbringings thrive in structured settings like the military, where they are immediately met with routine, mentorship, and guidance. Another example is the trend of disaffected youth in American prison systems who turn to Islam for its routine, structure, and promise for a better life. The same can be said about the rise of the Taliban from the Afghani refugee camps in Pakistan during the late 1980s. In this case, militant Islam and its leaders provided mentorship, routine, and purpose to thousands of orphaned and/or vulnerable males who sought explanations for their lack of autonomy.

Lack of Emotional Safety can come as a by-product from events that result from an individual's lack of physical safety, as is the case with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The absence of a nurtured upbringing, combined with effects from combat are a dynamic obstacle in the way of child soldiers as they attempt to reintegrate into society. In many cases, they act out in culturally unacceptable ways because they lack emotional safety and cannot cope with it.

An important part of emotional safety is the concept of “face” or pride. In many global areas, the violation of one's machismo or reputation may lead them to react in an unstable manner to avenge such an affront. In these cases, it is important to understand the dynamic that can make one willing to sacrifice their life (or the freedom to live their life) to save their reputation.

A lack of Emotional Safety does not just affect the person who endures the void, it may also affect those around the individual who suffer as a result of the mal-adaptive ways the individual adjusts. Interestingly, a reaction to an affront may elicit a response that is outside the limits of behavior acceptable to our western society while also being within the boundaries of behavior in a particular area. This is the case with many “honor

killings” seen in some areas of the world to protect the reputation of a family and its members.

The ability to explain the unexplainable, or Spiritual Safety, is one item not included by any of these theorists in figure 3. All individuals, regardless of how advanced or backward their society is, experience events beyond their explanation. People in these situations develop mechanisms to deal with the effects of such catastrophes, which usually manifests itself as religion,<sup>15</sup> or belief in the concepts of fate or chance. Regardless of how they choose to cope, the important act is the development of reasons why events occur. Therefore, a belief structure, or belief in a higher power of control, exists in every society. These mechanisms, reasons, and beliefs are manicured by spiritual safety specialists, known by names from “medicine man” to “imam” to “pastor.” Even “godless” societies, most notably Revolutionary France and the Soviet Union, failed to stamp out faith, as their heavy-handed efforts to do so only reinforced victims’ dependence on the existence of higher power to explain those calamities.

Why then, is this not listed as a “need” by any of the experts noted in figure 3? Surely, if the dependence on the belief in a higher power is as prevalent as noted in the above paragraph, then its existence would have been observed and noted. Maslow discussed this in terms of safety, “the tendency to have some religion or world philosophy that organizes the universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in part motivated by safety seeking.”<sup>16</sup> In this case, belief in a higher power is a function of safety, as one prays to a higher power for protection and guidance in the current life (among other things), and deliverance of one’s soul into the afterlife. Religion is also a factor in a group’s need for social control,<sup>17</sup> as it

provides the basis for a socially acceptable Rule of Law (ROL), as is the case with Sharia and U.S. law.

Lack of Economic Safety may affect a person's ability to meet their basic needs due to an inability to procure needs-satisfying resources. This may lead to unstable behavior like crime, in an attempt to avoid harm from a lack of needs satisfiers. This unstable behavior potentially threatens one's physical safety by placing them in situations where they may be harmed by others who are competing for, or own, the same finite resources. Physical safety is also threatened by an inability to procure or maintain mitigations (structured shelter) that enable physical safety. This cascades into affected people moving to areas where they are vulnerable to additional physical harm from crime, exposure, or poor nutrition, as well as emotional harm associated with loss of livelihood, "face," and even the loss of loved ones.

In the developing world, high unemployment of educated Military Aged Males (MAMs) is one of the most destabilizing and potentially violent threats to any regime.<sup>18</sup> MAM cohorts typically become unstable when they comprise 35 percent or more of the overall population.<sup>19</sup> In many developing countries, the labor market cannot absorb such a large influx. These cohorts who come of working age with more education than previous generations are particularly vulnerable when they are unable to find "appropriate" employment (a perception held by the individual).

Maslow discussed the need for "self-actualization" by arguing that if an individual's other needs were satisfied, they would then desire the freedom and ability to fulfill their potential as they see fit.<sup>20</sup> After years of being told that their hard work in school would pay off, they cannot comprehend their lack of employment opportunities,

and begin seeking explanations for their plight. In many cases, explanations come from opposition groups (legal and illegal), who prey on those who are desperate for someone to tell them that their current status is not their fault.<sup>21</sup>

In the case of MAMs who experience an inability to meet their Economic Safety needs, they also experience an inability to meet their needs in the other three safety-related areas:

Because of their inability to find work, many MAMs are forced to experience physical harm or participate in unstable behavior to meet their basic needs. This places them in a predicament where they are physically vulnerable to both the effects of a failure in needs-satisfaction and reactions to their criminal activity, depending on the path they choose. Additionally, if their group is perceived as unstable, the government regime may attempt to silence them in ways that further damage their ability to satisfy their basic needs.

Attacks on Spiritual Safety may be directed at the cohort because it belongs to a particular religious sect deemed dangerous to those in power. Additionally, the aforementioned vulnerability to extremist rhetoric makes MAMs vulnerable to spiritual wellbeing, as coercion or co-opting into participation in an unjust fatwa or jihad may jeopardize their spiritual welfare. Ironically, this is a case where freedom to practice religion may actually provide a path to spiritual harm rather than protect one from it, by allowing access to radical religious sects.

Loss of Emotional Safety is the most dynamic harm that MAMs endure in situations where they are marginalized. The inability to find employment leads to low self-esteem and a loss of status or “face” (among other more immediate needs voids).

This inability to earn income leads to an inability to gain status in the community as a viable, working adult. Furthermore, it limits the ability to procure the goods that provide them with the status of an eligible bachelor, like a house and a vehicle. This inability to present themselves to the community as a contributing adult worthy of marriage limits their ability to marry and raise a family. This further erodes their ability to gain the self-actualization Maslow talked about and the community recognition so important to many young men.<sup>22</sup> This all results in a social marginalization of the individual, leading many to choose unstable behavior to correct the void and reestablish socio-economic upward mobility.

The end summation of the safety needs is four-fold. First, individuals must live in a physical condition of safety that enables continual needs fulfillment. Second, they must have emotional security that allows for the development and continual use of socially acceptable decision-making skills. Third, they must have access to practice religion as they see fit, as it provides security in the afterlife and a bedrock for behavior, so long as the religion is culturally acceptable. Finally, they must possess the economic safety that enables the procurement those fulfillment-related items they do not produce themselves.

7. Medical care: This thesis considers health a starting point or precondition for humans' fulfillment of basic needs, much in the way Malinowski and Corning did.<sup>23</sup> Without a reasonable amount of health, individuals are incapable of fulfilling needs until corrective measures are taken. However, *medical care*, in terms of the ability to correct deviancies from the baseline standard of health needed to pursue needs satisfaction, is truly a need. Accessibility to medical care as part of the need, is vital, since one cannot

achieve satisfaction of this need if they cannot access it. In the pursuit of medical care, we add to it three primary areas of concern: Preventative, Curative, and Palliative.<sup>24</sup>

Preventive Care acts are those which are essential to continuing the existing health condition of an individual and staving off harm, allowing them the renewed ability to pursue needs-fulfillment. Curative Care improves the degraded condition of an individual to prevent long term and/or irreversible harm. Palliative Care provide comfort in the face of pain associated with conditions that harm an individual.

The satisfaction of the need for medical care must be accomplished in such a way that ensures long-term normative function through preventative care, with the ability to correct deficiencies in health if they so arise. Palliative medical care, or pain-killing, while humane and comforting to those who endure discomfort and those who empathize with victims, is of lesser importance in extreme resource-limited situations.

8. Social Freedoms of mobility, choice, and access: Mobility, choice, and access mean a person can act on the potential they believe they possess, without being locked into a certain caste due to circumstances beyond their control. While individuals may fail in their endeavors, they must have a chance to pursue success in endeavors of their “choice.” In societies that have rigid class structures, “access” to opportunities that enable upward social “mobility” is limited. This increases the potential for unstable responses by the affected,<sup>25</sup> as young men without legal options to earn a wage and climb the ladder of socio-economic status will usually do so illegally.<sup>26</sup> Although on the surface, denial of “mobility,” “choice,” and “access” will not directly lead to the harm or death of an individual, the resulting degraded performance and socially unacceptable responses can lead to instability, and sometimes death.

In some cases, the constant pursuit of needs satisfaction in other areas (safety, food, shelter, etc.) prevents an individual from satisfying the need for “choice” in use of time and resources. Such an individual is likely to eventually experience a breakdown that inhibits effective societal participation and needs satisfaction until appropriate medical care corrects it. “Choice” may also pertain to leisure activities; Malinowski argues that occasional relaxation is a biological need that every culture must satisfy.<sup>27</sup> This concept is reinforced by many studies that value a person’s ability to engage in leisure activities as essential to long and healthy life.

The *Calvert-Henderson Quality of Life Indicators* refers to one of their pursuits, “Re-Creation,” as activities undertaken to revitalize or reinvent oneself for rejuvenated or improved interaction in life. This concept brings us back to *choice*, where an individual decides how to use their time. This ability to improve oneself is critical to normative function, as those who perceive themselves as being “locked-in” typically experience mental harm, such as depression. This is evidenced by many elderly who feel their “life is over,” or by young adults who lash out in anger at those who deny them “mobility,” “choice,”<sup>28</sup> and “access,”<sup>29</sup> as is the case with many MAMs.

**9. Social Participation:** An individual gains access to information through societal interaction, which in turn fuels growth; the volume of which depends on the person’s acceptance of such information as beneficial. With growth comes the potential for acceptance and recognition,<sup>+++30</sup> which directly affects one’s chances to achieve needs-fulfillment. Failure to participate in society can force an individual to live in a degraded

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<sup>+++</sup>These two attainments become increasingly difficult and depend on a score of other factors such as work ethic, level of social participation (networking), access to opportunity, and chance.

status with limited needs satisfaction and increased chances of suffering harm, as is the previously mentioned case with many MAMs.

To satisfy basic needs, a person must know the techniques associated with doing so. Humans learn in different ways, through instruction from a teacher, or by through examples and/or works of others. Critical to the process are the external influences that provide the information. Without this contact, either direct (teacher) or indirect (following an example), the organism will fail to adapt beyond the primal instincts they are born with.

Structured interaction, usually in the form of controlled activities (sports, school, etc.) enables learning and discipline through the streamlining of choices (acceptable within the society's rules) available to the individual. This limiting of choices actually allows the individual to better focus resources on those that are available.<sup>31</sup> Reasonable limitation of choices and subsequent participation in structured activities also teaches the individual social skills critical to acceptable cultural interaction, such as patience (waiting for one's turn) and restraint (playing within the rules).

The type of information is as important as its presence.<sup>32</sup> In a modern sense, teaching someone the Greek Classics at the expense of vocational skills, when their only hope for employment is in a factory, will inhibit their ability to gain employment that enables the procurement of needs-fulfilling resources. In this case, because the knowledge learned does not enable needs fulfillment, they must access other information that does, whether through other legal means (additional schooling) or culturally unacceptable practices (crime). However, if the learned information leads the organism to grow in ways that are culturally unacceptable, their growth will be stunted until

corrected. Sometimes this correction may cause permanent harm to a person's health (execution for a crime) or mobility, choice, and access (reduced employment possibilities based on one's criminal record). In other cases, the correction cannot fully restore a person's range of choices had they not engaged in detrimental behavior in the first place. Teen pregnancy and child soldiering are examples. Because of missed opportunities for education in their younger years, many who fall into these two areas cannot recover their full range of choice, as adult education may prove too difficult due to present responsibilities and stunted knowledge from a lack of previous schooling. Failure to access additional information that enables adaptation (legal or illegal) results in the individual failing to thrive altogether, and possibly death.

As people learn the techniques associated with needs fulfillment, they also must adapt with the environment to ensure continual needs satisfaction. Without the information to adapt, they will surely suffer harm. As an infant transitions through childhood to adulthood, its environment evolves, as do their methods of basic needs fulfillment; eventually, the benefactor who provides for their basic needs will no longer do so. In this case, satisfying the need for food is not as simple as opening one's mouth and chewing what's placed in it. They must understand that certain needs (food) are no longer being provided to them. Once this understanding occurs, they then must acquire the means and knowledge needed to procure and prepare food in order to consume its nutritional value.

Adults who are fully capable of meeting their basic needs may also seek personal growth, in terms of advanced education, or seeking out challenges at various stages in one's life. While a stable society does not depend on its members continually seeking out

challenges and growth, access to information for such endeavors is critical to its proper function, lest its members lack the “mobility” necessary to do so within their perceived capabilities. This links back to the concept of “Re-creation” mentioned earlier.

### Drivers of Instability

Based on the information above, we know individuals experiencing voids in needs-satisfaction must prioritize their finite resources and decide which needs to meet first in order to avoid harm. This prioritization, paired with an understanding of possible reactions to voids in needs fulfillment, allows us to derive the following Drivers of Instability (see figures 4 and 20). These root causes provide a prioritization to stability operators for when to focus efforts and resources on combating respective needs-satisfaction voids in order to reestablish stability.

Little empirical data exists that supports direct causal links between deprivation of a particular need and unstable behavior that achieves satisfaction. However, there is significant evidence of indirect causal links related to voids in needs-satisfaction and instability. The critical part to analyze is how individuals and groups react to voids in needs-fulfillment: do they accept depravity and incur harm, appeal to social controlling elements for help, resort to unstable behavior (theft, seizure, uprising, etc.), change the paradigm (migrate, search for alternate methods of fulfillment, pursue education, etc.)? It is the decision(s), or lack of, to fulfill basic needs that will potentially lead to instability.

Accepting depravity and harm is typically not an option for individuals, unless they have exhausted all other legal and illegal options. In situations where depravity reaches this level, the social controlling element likely has questioned legitimacy.<sup>33</sup> In many cases, such voids in needs-satisfaction (like famine) result in outside organizations

intervening and fostering needs-fulfillment, further demonstrating the government's ineptness. Indirectly, this decision may lead to unstable behavior as well, as witnessed by government upheavals in Ethiopia following some of their more severe famines in the 1970s and 1980s.

Appealing to social-controlling elements for help in achieving needs-fulfillment is not typically associated with instability. However, when the social controlling element is unable to satisfy these needs, they experience decreased legitimacy in popular opinion for their inability to provide basic services.<sup>34</sup> By extension, this action of asking for help, and not receiving it, can lead to unstable behavior when the government is viewed as illegitimate and unable to foster basic needs-fulfillment.

Unstable behavior, designed to fill a void in needs-satisfaction, is what most think of when they associate voids in basic needs-fulfillment and instability. Individual theft, food riots, political coups, armed rebellion, and intra-state violence driven by competition for scarce resources are some of the more typical examples. People will react in this manner if they believe legal and acceptable means will not achieve needs-satisfaction (leaving unstable actions as the only viable option) or illegal actions taken to gather needs-fulfilling resources are worth the consequences of being caught.

Changing the paradigm of the needs-satisfaction problem involves many options. In famine situations, people may choose to adjust their means of food production (plant different crops), build food stocks, adjust their dietary habits (eat less or different food), roam in search of food, or migrate to food-abundant areas.<sup>35</sup> Roaming or migration likely cause instability as encroachment on other areas, which usually experience stress in resource availability as well, will cause competing groups to react unfavorably. This

resource competition is a major unstable byproduct of reactions to voids in needs-fulfillment.<sup>36</sup> In less-dire situations, others may choose to seek a better education in order to gain better access to employment, and by extension, needs-fulfillment. However, in most under-developed areas where people experience the potential for void-related harm, options for personal improvement and subsequent upward mobility are limited. Although, if these options are available, they are less-likely to cause instability; while some may argue upward mobility can cause instability as rival groups react to new competition, studies show a correlation between overall increased education levels and decreased potential for instability.<sup>37</sup>

Since each option for action can directly or indirectly result in instability, stability operators must instead understand which voids in needs-fulfillment force a course of action decision soonest. Knowing this hierarchy of decision-making urgency allows stability operators to focus resources on solving the most critical voids in needs-satisfaction before decisions must be made.

“Primary Drivers of Instability” (PDI) are a failure to satisfy the Individual Basic Needs of Air, Food,<sup>38</sup> Water, Thermoregulation,<sup>39</sup> Safety, and Medical care.<sup>40</sup> Voids of these needs will cause physiological harm the quickest, forcing at-risk individuals and groups to make timely decisions on how to address these voids before they incur harm. For PDIs, immediate emergencies related to physiological harm may limit the options available to the individual. For example, one cannot get a better education, that enables

higher paying employment, to solve their food insecurity--they must possess sufficient food first. <sup>41</sup>

“Secondary Drivers of Instability” (SDI) are a failure to satisfy the Individual Basic Needs of Social Freedoms and Social Participation. Unmet voids in these areas do not cause harm in the same timeframe that PDIs do, because these voids do not directly result in physiological harm.<sup>41</sup> The decision to pursue satisfaction of these needs may occur within days of gaining awareness of the void(s), or wait generations before it is addressed.

“Tertiary Drivers of Instability” (TDI) are a failure to satisfy Perceived Needs or wants.<sup>42</sup> If not eventually addressed or discredited, this void may cause personnel to react in an unstable manner in order to achieve fulfillment. Addressing these specific “wants” acknowledges the desire by poor and developing groups to raise their living standard and emulate other more advanced nations.<sup>43</sup> This is a main reason why the BNA failed in the 1980s; it was perceived to only focus on fulfilling the basic needs of individuals, at the expense of socio-economic aspirations of individuals and societies.<sup>44</sup>

A contemporary TDI example is electricity. In Afghanistan, many parts of the country have never enjoyed reliable electric, if any at all. Consequently, a failure to provide power to a newly secured village is unlikely to cause instability. However, in Iraq, the majority of the population enjoyed electricity prior to the 2003 invasion. When under the early days of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) it was no longer reliably available, Iraqis began to protest that their conditions were “better under

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<sup>41</sup> One who experiences voids in Metabolism-related needs likely lack the resources needed to gain an education anyway. Fred Cuny stresses that famine is more a cause of a lack of resources to procure food, rather than a shortage of food to buy.

Sadaam,” eroding legitimacy of the CPA and the fledgling attempts to establish legitimate Iraqi governance.

As seen in figures 4 and 20, Safety lies on the cusp between a PDI and SDI. Physical Safety is considered a PDI, as voids in this area directly relate to physiological harm. Spiritual, Emotional, and Economic Safety are considered SDIs, as voids in these areas do not directly link to physiological harm. An important consideration is the intangibles that trigger some, whose Physical Safety is vulnerable, to react, where others do not. This is the same with Spiritual, Emotional, and Economic Safety. A critical element in what conditions trigger a response is ambivalence. When a population loses confidence or hope in a situation improving, they may no longer struggle to achieve basic needs. Likewise, a population pushed by the actions of one group into another competing group’s sphere of influence (or is won over by a group’s competency in ensuring the fulfillment of basic needs) may accept voids in needs-satisfaction if they believe their sacrifice is in their long-term best interests. These phenomena are witnessed in many of the mass killings, purges, and genocides of the 20th Century, as well as the study of population behavior in counterinsurgencies.

Identifying the Drivers of Instability, and the urgency with which to address them, provides stability operators with a better ability to focus efforts and resources in constrained environments. The next step is understanding how societies adapt to ensure these needs are met in order to avoid unstable behavior.

### Group Fulfillment Adaptations

Human collaboration allows for specialization in labor, fostering a more efficient fulfillment of individual basic needs. As people join together and form cohorts or

societies, the items below must exist to allow the group to exist in relative stability. Without them, the society will collapse and cease to enable the fulfillment of the basic needs, threatening their survival as well. The order is important, as the economic systems mentioned below will exist in any society, regardless of the security situation (as in Somalia today).<sup>45</sup> However, a government's ability to control a society will make the difference between an economic system that enables the population to prosper, and one that fails to allow society to meet their basic needs.

1. Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production. Every culture must produce satisfiers that allow individuals to achieve a normative level of health. These activities constitute the economic base for any society, regardless of variables associated with climate, geography, and other demographics.<sup>46</sup> The proper functioning of this system that protects against what FM 3-07 refers to as, “the reoccurrence of systematic failure,”<sup>47</sup> and thus targets the Drivers of Instability.

This Economic System is made up of smaller Cycles that produce specific outputs essential to meeting basic needs, allowing for the specialization of the labor force. The exchange of goods and services provides specialists with compensation for the needs-satisfiers they produce, which allows them to procure other satisfiers they do not produce themselves.<sup>48</sup> The goods and services produced by the group must meet the needs of all members. If this fails to happen, whether due to incompetence, laziness, poor skills, or calamity, the whole cohort suffers until that need satisfier is again produced, or an alternative resource is found.

Each cycle, involves elements of security, education and training, and rules.<sup>49</sup> This ensures standards are followed and provides consumers and producers alike with a

level of confidence in the system. Such legitimacy is essential to the smooth function of the Economic System.

The Security Cycle provides an environment where specialists can concentrate efforts and resources without fear of physical attack (that would cause a subsequent drain as they struggled to compensate for this lack of protection). Security allows for the safe transport of all resources and products, whether specialists traveling to work, raw materials transiting to factories, finished goods traveling to markets, or information moving through cyberspace. Security also enables specialists to trust that they will receive appropriate compensation for their efforts. Failure to do so means they will siphon resources and effort from their primary specialty to other areas in order to compensate for this fear and ensure sufficient resources for needs-satisfying procurement (or move to another specialty altogether).

The Education and Training of specialists cycle maintains and/or improves knowledge in a particular area. Specialists must receive this training and pass on these skills to others who can improve the output of such specialization or inherit the responsibility altogether. This transfer of knowledge is critical in ensuring a baseline of legitimacy, and allows consumers to approach a specialist, whom they have no previous relation with, and conduct business. This training and education typically occurs through apprenticeship and/or formal schooling, which teaches skills specific to the economic cycle and related to business management.

“Rules” dictate how such skills can be employed for the collective needs-satisfaction of the group, such as the Posse Comotatus Act and its effects on internal security, or the FDA’s control of the Commissariat. “Rules” establish standards of

conduct for all members throughout the economic system that leads to legitimacy and confidence. These must be abided by and enforces when necessary, or the system will undergo undue shocks, like the U.S. system has in recent years with the lead concerns regarding Chinese imports and medical malpractice's effect on overall medical care prices.

The following four cycles in figure 5 essential to the survival of the society itself, as they address the Drivers of Instability (see figure 4) and ensure needs-resource availability for all. These exist in any properly functioning Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production: Security, Commissariat, Thermoregulation, and the Reproduction and Training of New Members. Other Cycles may emerge as perceived need and demand requires, especially in post-conflict situations. This information provides prioritization to which Cycles of the Economic System (depending of which Drivers of Instability they address) are in the most urgent need of attention in post-conflict situations. Demographics particular to the conflict may adjust this prioritization, but in situations where all needs-fulfillment is vulnerable, this information provides stability operators with a start point for action.

	Need	Cycle within the <i>Economic System</i> that provides for the need
PDI	Air	Directly from <i>Social Control</i> (establishes clean air standards)
	Water	<i>Commissariat</i>
	Food	<i>Commissariat</i>
	Waste Elimination	<i>Commissariat &amp; Thermoregulation</i>
	Safety (physical)	<i>Security, Thermoregulation, Reproduction and Training of New Members</i>
	Safety (emotional)	<i>Security</i> (protects against anxiety) and <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members</i>
	Safety (spiritual)	<i>Reproduction and Training of New Members</i> (religion)
	Safety (economic)	<i>Social Control</i> and the <i>Economic System</i> (worker protection laws and social welfare)
SDI	Medical Care (preventative)	<i>Security</i> (physiological)
	Medical Care (palliative)	<i>Security</i> (physiological)
	Medical Care (curative)	<i>Security</i> (physiological)
	Thermoregulation	<i>Thermoregulation</i>
	Social Freedoms (mobility)	<i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control</i> (laws that protect freedoms)
	Social Freedoms (choice)	<i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control</i> (laws that protect freedoms)
	Social Freedoms (access)	<i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control</i> (laws that protect freedoms)
	Social Participation (education)	<i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control</i> (laws that protect freedoms)
	Social Participation (socialization)	<i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control</i> (laws that protect freedoms)

Figure 4. How the Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production Addresses Drivers of Instability

Source: Developed by the author.




Figure 5. Overview of the Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production

Source: Developed by author.

Maslow argues that a “‘good’ society ordinarily makes its members feel safe enough from wild animals, extremes of temperature, crime, assault and murder, tyranny, etc.”<sup>50</sup> In short, an individual’s need to safeguard himself shrinks when specialists provide *security* for the group as a whole. As a result, individual resources previously dedicated to self-security are available for other activities that increase one’s ability to meet their other basic needs. This adaptation ensures not only Physical Security (protection from attack), but Physiological (the ability to care for those whose health is degraded) as well, as depicted in figure 6.




Figure 6. Economic System (Security Cycle)  
Source: Developed by author.

The idea of collective Physical Security, provided by a select group of individuals who make this their focus, allows other members to specialize in other areas, making crop yields larger, shelter more stable, medicine more effective, etc. Myles Standish of Plymouth and John Smith of Jamestown are two Security specialists whose expertise allowed the members of their settlements to focus on other need-satisfying duties. Contemporary national, regional, and local security apparatus' (military and police as an example) does the same. The competence and performance of these designated groups directly effects the adaptation of Social Control, as an inability to secure the population from harm delegitimizes the government whose responsibility it is to protect the cohort from such harms.

The individual need for access to Medical Care is included under the Physiological Security heading, as it reestablishes the constant of health which is essential for basic needs fulfillment. Lack of access to such corrective measures also effects Social Control, as it has the potential to delegitimize leaders in the same way a lack of physical security does (as seen in the 2009 U.S. medical care debates). Without the ability for a society to protect its population from the effects of disease, people will live in constant anxiety that rivals their fear of animal or human attack. Failure to protect a population from the ravaging effects of disease, starvation, or other health-related effects will likely cause the cohort to react in emergency response ways noted by Maslow, such as shunning of infected individuals, or hoarding of resources.

Malinowski's concept of "Commissariat" best explains why food is a basic need and how cultures adapt to ensure sufficient quantities of it. In a modern society, the system that enables us to grab a snack from the refrigerator involves dozens of steps that

are accomplished before we ever unwrap and eat it. Food chains are so long, and so dependent a length of factors, that upheavals can occur when a single link is effected. One only has to look at famines of the past half-century to comprehend the fragility of this chain. Famines occur when the food distribution network or market system is disrupted by social, environmental, and/or economic upheaval and effects a significant amount of the population.<sup>51</sup> Rarely is it as simple as a lack of food.

Fortunately (as noted in figure 7), functioning societies possess rules and knowledge that mitigate these risks at every stop. Furthermore, we are fortunate to live in a nation where we are able to easily survive breaks in the process. During the recent tomato Salmonella outbreak, people in the United States survived quite well, with only the mild inconvenience of throwing out tomato-based products from the refrigerator or pantry, and forgoing tomato-based foods at restaurants. This is not possible in areas that do not enjoy the overall abundance of varied foods that we do. Such mitigations allow the Commissariat cycle to survive “shocks” like these.




Figure 7. Economic System (Commissariat Cycle)

Source: Developed by the author with information from Branislav Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 96-99.

This function is also linked with other needs-fulfilling sub-cycles (as noted in figure 5). Security enables producers, transporters, merchants, and consumers to remain free from harm at all stages of the chain, allowing the cycle to function effectively.<sup>52</sup> Markets must maintain appropriate and stable prices that allow specialists from other non food-producing areas of the economic system to procure food in sufficient quantity with the compensation they earn from their specialized production. When prices skyrocket beyond appropriate compensation levels within the economic system, people are unable

to buy food with the resources they have and famine begins. Specialists throughout the cycle must be trained and educated. Farmers must understand the techniques and considerations associated with the agribusiness, and conform to standards set by the Food and Drug Administration. Food preparation specialists must understand techniques associated with storage of food until it is prepared, and techniques leading to a safe, nutritious, and palatable meal. Those consuming the meal must abide by manners while eating, which are cultural measures meant to ensure a safe (small bites) and enjoyable (chew with your mouth closed) process of caloric intake.<sup>53</sup> If any of the enablers mentioned above fail to exist, the function breaks down and depravity ensues, potentially leading to harm on a variety of scales.

An example of such a breakdown is the 2009 famine in Ethiopia. A five year reduction in rainfall (and a “green drought”) effected agricultural output, which drove food prices up 64 percent.<sup>54</sup> This forced many people to sell off livestock in order to generate food-procuring revenue, flooding the livestock market and driving prices down. This loss of value further degrades individuals’ ability to meet their needs. The delicate nature of the cycle, especially in areas that lack complex protections against “shocks” like drought and other environmental issues, is further complicated by issues external to the immediate area. The internal turmoil from the 2008 election crisis in Zimbabwe resulted in land seizures and farmers being evicted from their plots, while fertile lands were given to workers who lacked proper agribusiness knowledge. These events cascaded to cause Zimbabwe, a country that used to produce vast excesses of food for distribution throughout Africa, to import food to keep supplies at minimum levels. This indirectly

effected on overall food prices on the African continent, further limiting Ethiopians' ability to meet their basic needs.

The “Thermoregulation” Cycle, depicted in figure 8, ensures products are available for people to use in their efforts to maintain a constant bodily temperature. One example is the harvesting of energy-producing natural resources, which are transported directly to the user (fire wood) or to central facilities for the production of electric (coal). This powers household appliances that regulate temperature in appropriately constructed buildings, like furnaces or air conditioning.<sup>55</sup>




Figure 8. Economic System (Thermoregulation Cycle)  
Source: Developed by author.

Rules that govern this industry focus on areas like resource-preserving harvest limits, building codes, and commodity market regulations which relate to prices. Cultural rules are also present in this cycle, as we see the acceptance of skin exposure in Western female fashions that are unacceptable in other areas of the globe. Safety standards exist that regulate the presence of early warning systems that detect fire and/or other hazards that relate heating systems; this also ties into the Security Cycle.

Education and Training also has its place in this Cycle. Adults train children to put on a coat when they go outside in the winter, or to shut windows in a building when the air conditioner is running. Tradesmen learn their business through apprenticeship that teaches proper techniques and business skills that lead to appropriate compensation for services. Individuals learn how to heat or cool their body through the ingestion of appropriate foods and/or liquids.

The Thermoregulation Cycle fulfills other needs as well. Inside the Metabolism need, the ingestion of high-carbohydrate food gives the body a quick burst of joules, while the drinking of hot liquids heat one's core and allow for better regulation of body heat. Shelter that provides Safety from physical attack or disease-carriers also aids in the body's regulation of core body temperature by providing relief from extreme heat and sunlight or cold weather effects.

Each society must "Reproduce and Train New Membership" in sufficient quantity to assume the place of those who can no longer fulfill their duties and roles. This does not mean that every member must produce offspring. However, since the majority of humans consider reproduction and nurturing a significant part of the human experience, society will devote a significant amount of capital and effort on producing goods and services

that relate to the satisfaction of this need.<sup>56</sup> This, in of itself, develops a needs-fulfillment production cycle (as seen in figure 9). Consequently, many people who are unable or unwilling to personally reproduce may find themselves involved in the process simply because of the need for employment so they can satisfy their individual basic needs.<sup>57</sup>

Participation in the satisfaction of this group need allows them to do just that.




Figure 9. Economic System (Education and Training of New Members Cycle)  
Source: Developed by author.

The cohort must ensure its members are healthy enough to continue the reproductive process;<sup>58</sup> this involves the need for preventative and curative medical care,

whether neo-natal, post-natal, and/or pediatric. If reproductive capabilities are degraded (as is the case with communities who experience high birth defect rates due to environmental conditions-India's fertile valley as an example),<sup>59</sup> society will either not survive, or it will incur the burden of individuals who cannot properly contribute to needs satisfaction. This issue cascades by inhibiting the needs-fulfilling capabilities of those forced to care for and produce for the less-productive members of the group.

Socialization is a function of education and recreation, as it provides a setting where new members can learn to act within socially acceptable boundaries which are designed to prepare them for success later on in life.<sup>60</sup> Next, new members are trained for roles they will inherit in society, which prepares individuals for specific societal roles in which they are expected to participate in order to be considered a productive member of the group.<sup>61</sup> This can be in the form of an apprenticeship<sup>62</sup> or additional education above and beyond that which is normally associated with the socialization of youth. From participation in such a finishing system, one gains the transmission of skills and techniques learned by previous generations, thereby alleviating that person from relearning past lessons and stagnating the society's ability to progress. They additionally gain an understanding of what appropriate compensation is for the goods and services they produce,<sup>63</sup> allowing them to specialize, rather than produce their own needs satisfiers for fear of poor compensation and resulting failure to achieve basic needs satisfaction.

One important portion of this cycle relates to the conflicts that arise as generations compete for the optimal satisfaction of their needs in areas where there is competition for limited resources. Corning argues that the cohort must ensure that it does not sacrifice the

future needs satisfaction of the younger generation to satisfy the wants of the generation in power.<sup>64</sup> If this does occur, the future needs-satisfaction potential of the younger generation, and its overall economic and physical health, is placed in jeopardy.<sup>65</sup> This will cascade to effect the overall stability of the society.

As older generations age and can no longer produce and procure the same volume of needs-satisfiers, younger generations must fill this void. If sufficient quantities of younger members have not been produced, the younger generations will be unable to produce needs-satisfiers in sufficient quantity for all, including the offspring they are responsible for and the older generation who is no longer producing. In the United States, we will see this imbalance in the future, as working generations will not be able to produce enough needs-satisfiers for themselves and the aging and increasingly unproductive Baby Boomers. This is why economists are predicting the future insolvency of Social Security and Medicaid: those who currently pay into the system cannot keep pace with the increasing amount of those who need to use it.

For the protection of a society's future, one generation must ensure that the next generation, who will eventually be called upon to provide for them in old age, is produced in sufficient quantity to ensure that this societal responsibility is not a burden. A "productive member" is not just biological offspring, but children of other group members who cannot or will not provide this upbringing, or are émigrés to the group from somewhere else. The responsibility for reproduction and training may have to occur at the expense of the "old age" generation's wants, for if this fails to occur, the generation who assumes responsibility for provision of needs-satisfiers will either be permanently burdened, or will pass the burden to subsequent generations (or both).

Another critical effect on maintaining a proper ratio of needs-satisfier producers to consumers within a society is protection from disease. Under normative conditions, societies should be able produce enough children to offset the decreased production of older generations. However, societies ravaged by disease not only lose critical producers from the labor pool, but other producers must devote resources and time to the care of the sick, further diminishing overall output. Many African nations, effected by Malaria and HIV/AIDS, endure this draining cycle, which in turn forces increased birth rates in rural communities in an effort to get above the wavetop of disease-related losses to the community labor force.

A compounded version of this effect is found in Uganda, where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is siphoning children from villages near the Sudanese border to fill their ranks. This has a multi-tiered effect on villages already living with the threat of Malaria and at the edge of government services for basic needs. When children are taken from these villages, it not only drains future manpower from the labor force, but it also presents a conundrum to the parents of those remaining: escort children to school, risk losing them while they travel to and from school unescorted, or take them out of school altogether. Escorting children may be safer, but it creates a labor shock to the economic system when those who previously were specialists in other cycles are forced to become *security* specialists for a portion of time each day, effecting overall resource output and availability. Taking children out of school does not completely protect them from being swiped, as the LRA may conduct manpower raids into rural areas, and it also breaks down the Reproduction and Training of New Members Cycle. This further effects the future of the economic system as future generations lack the proper schooling to assume

roles within the village. The third option, status quo, isn't much better. Living in constant fear of a child being taken, only to have those fears realized, deprives families of Emotional Safety. This further decreases productivity in respective cycles of the economic system, leading villagers to lose trust in their leadership and act out in unstable ways.

The Cycles detailed here are not a complete model. Rather, they are the minimum needed for the society to function in a stable manner. If these cycles are not regulated by the government, they will be by another organization (whether legal or illegal), as reciprocal individual specialization cannot occur without such controls. What drives the amount of cycles in a particular system is the society's perception of what their needs are, or more importantly, what their wants are.\*\*\*\* If you can convince someone that your service/product is a need, you've created a demographic and an industry. This allows for stability when goods and services are equitably produced, distributed, accessed, and bought. There is a critical interconnectedness to economic system. The sub-systems mentioned above cannot exist alone. Instead, each enables the other to perform better through specialization of individuals. Furthermore, physical security and clear standards of individual behavior with the ability to enforce such rules push the economic system to even higher levels of efficiency. When people can truly specialize because they are secure in the understanding that they will be appropriately compensated for their goods and services, they can produce more needs-satisfying resources. This further ensures availability of particular resources, allowing others to better focus on their production

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\*\*\*\*This is where electricity and other “enablers” come in. While not a true “need” or an adaptation essential to needs satisfaction, it does make the overall process of fulfillment and adaptation more efficient.

specialties. This security in the availability of needs-satisfying resources is enabled by social control.

2. Social Control (Governance and Rule of Law). Governments exist to ensure the availability of needs-fulfilling resources and the individual's ability to satisfy their basic needs. They do this by fostering an environment favorable to the efficient functioning of the Economic System, and individual participation within it. Such fostering is done through a concentration on “Rules” through four “Essential Elements” aided by two “Enablers.”

Every community, regardless of how primitive or advanced, has a system of “Essential Elements” headed by recognized leadership that makes and/or validates rules. This system also has mechanisms that instruct its members on rules for acceptable behavior and possesses the ability to correct deviations and reestablish such structures.<sup>66</sup> When rules are broken or questioned, the system has the ability to interpret rules and adjudicate issues. The established rules that allow for the fulfillment of basic needs must be followed, or the group will suffer when such critical structures breaks down.<sup>67</sup>

This legal framework allows for standards in day to day life and aids in the achievement of safety (from physical harm or deficiencies in needs fulfillment) for the group. The rules set forth primarily regulate the conduct of the Economic System of Needs Satisfier Production and establish baselines for behavior that enables trust. Without this, specialization of labor breaks down because individuals are never able to fully concentrate on developing their expertise. Rather, they continually worry about appropriate compensation for goods and services they provide that allows them to procure the needs-satisfiers that they cannot produce. Consequently, specialists are forced

to meet their needs without help from others, taking a resource-producing individual out of a particular production pool. This cascades to other specialists who now lack sufficient availability of needs-satisfying resources. Rampant violation of the rules that govern society leads to inefficiency in, and possibly shortages of, needs-satisfying output, causing calamities associated with voids in needs-fulfillment. In this case, people will either perish or be incorporated into other systems.<sup>68</sup> Historical examples such as the French and Russian Revolutions, the Great Leap Forward, and the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia document this. In each case, individual basic needs satisfaction was hugely interdicted as established rules were broken and governments who were supposed to uphold such structures were overthrown. This upheaval resulted in the loss of life on a massive scale because the social change that propelled it interrupted the established cycles of needs-satisfying production. Once the cycles, that the population had adapted to depend on regardless of their efficiency, were non-functioning, individuals were forced to satisfy needs themselves or within new cycles (like Collectivization) with far less success.

Inside of the Economic System, formal and informal rules control each Cycle as well. Physical Security has rules that guide personal interaction and rules of engagement for security specialists. Physiological Security is governed by many layers of rules. Primitive societies developed rules regulating health-related behavior because of a lack of understanding of how disease spreads. The “unsanitary” left hand in many Middle Eastern areas is an example of this. The Hippocratic Oath doctors take is another example. Modern medicine is full for formal and informal rules, from washing one’s hands to toxicity awareness with certain drugs. Thermoregulation has rules that establish

building codes, while certain cultures establish rules dictating how much skin one may show in their dress. This ranges from Sharia Law's effects on women's clothing options, to "No shirt, no shoes, no service" (this also has ties to culturally accepted standards of dress and fear of disease). The Commissariat is also governed by many formal and informal rules. This ranges from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) establishing standards for transportation and storage of meat, to passing food containers to someone instead of using one's hands to pass the food itself.

The efficient establishment of social control and rules involves Elements and Enablers, as depicted in figure 10 below. Essential Elements of Social Control are those bodies that must exist for the efficient implementation of rules, leading to control of the group. They consist of: Rule Makers, Rule Teachers, Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators, and Rule Enforcers.

Rule Makers are typically the leadership of any group. In the western world, these are typically voted officials or those who are appointed into rule making positions. In a primitive model, rule makers could be a chieftain or a tribal elder who makes rules as part of a group. Regardless, these groups make and adjust rules, as necessary, to ensure conditions are set that allows for the most efficient and productive satisfaction of basic needs.

Once rules are established by the leading body, these guidelines are passed on to group members by Rule Teachers. This function typically occurs inside the Reproduction and Training of New Members cycle. Rule Teachers ensure that those about to join the collective labor pool are equipped with an understanding of what their roles with the society are and acceptable behavior is. Members of this group include parents, teachers,

coaches, mentors, religious figures, and masters of apprentices. Rule Teachers can also include those who simply alert others to changes in the rules, such as modern media personnel, or a “town crier.”

Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators provide analysis and decisions regarding existing rules when conflicts arise regarding the abiding by and enforcement of such guidelines. Typically, these individuals are well-respected and possess a volume of knowledge regarding the importance of rules, precedence, and fairness.

Rule Enforcers ensure that laws are followed by the group, and bring individuals who are suspected of not following rules before those who can produce a decision. Rule enforcement is embedded within the Security Cycle of the Economic System.

These four Essential Elements must exist in any society where social control is exerted and the FSS are fulfilled. They are enhanced by the existence of the three Enablers of Social Control: Generation of Revenue, Information Management and Legitimacy, and Neighborly Relations.

Social Controlling elements must generate resources to compensate the Essential Elements for their services. These resources are usually gained in the form of a tax, and are paid in currency or commodity (food, manpower, supplies, crops, etc.). Social controlling groups must monopolize this ability to gain revenue, as competitors who generate revenue not only increase their ability to compensate and strengthen parallel Essential Elements of Social Control, but they siphon potential taxes away. This takes resources out of circulation within the legitimate Economic System, and further weakens needs-satisfying ability of the now additionally burdened tax base. Revenue is also a critical enabler in attaining and/or maintaining good relations with neighboring regimes,

as many controlling elements have averted conflict with potential competitors or co-opted support in conflicts through payments (as witnessed in the United States' ability to pay for smaller nations' participation in the War on Terror). No element seeking to establish and maintain social control can do so without monopolizing the ability to generate revenue.

A critical element of ensuring Legitimacy in the eyes of the population is Information Management. If any of the individuals within that chain are viewed as unworthy, corrupt, ignorant, or any combination thereof, their guidance will be viewed as illegitimate. Consequently, the rules set forth will not be respected and potentially violated, regardless of their viability in ensuring needs fulfillment. This "art of the sale," regardless of how far-fetched it may be, is critical to the concept of Legitimacy. A group's ability to sell their actions to the population, as well as vilify rival organizations, is vital to the level of social control they can exercise. This is true in democratic societies, as seen in the onslaught of political ads during election seasons, as well as primitive societies, where songs and chants frequently refer to a group's past accolades as well as current strength; all meant to put fear in their enemies and attract new followers. In the developing world, Hamas rose to power in this decade due to their ability to advertise the "good" they did for Palestinians, as well as their ability to paint the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in a negative light. A social controlling elements' ability to manage information can even prevent unstable behavior when the population's needs are severely threatened, as long as the message convinces the population that their sacrificed needs are temporary and worthy of the overall cause. This phenomenon is seen in the study of

popular reaction to voids in needs-satisfaction during the Russian and French Revolutions, the Great Depression, and during the Nazi's rise to power in Germany.

While it is possible for ruling group to achieve stability within an area without being viewed as legitimate, this will surely come at the expense of the populations Social Freedoms, thus failing to abide by the FSS, and endangering long-term stability.

Part of social control is Neighborly Relations, or the ability to control one's boundaries and maintain stable relations of mutual existence with other regimes. When this breaks down, social control is endangered. This cycle is commonly referred to when international relations practitioners discuss "bad neighborhoods." Examples include Hamas' inability to maintain Gazan sovereignty in the face of Israeli military actions during Operation Cast Lead, South Vietnam's inability to resolve their issues with North Vietnam or control their external borders, or the Khmer Rouge's inability to gain international legitimacy and approval for their internal social upheavals.

## SOCIAL CONTROL: *Essential Elements and Enablers*

### Essential Elements of Social Control

- **Rule Makers:** Societal leaders (formal and informal) who are recognized by the group. Examples are elected leaders, teachers, clergy, family or clan leadership, warlords.
- **Rule Teachers:** People who teach and train other (typically younger) members of the group what rules and behaviors are acceptable. Examples are parents, teachers, coaches, clergy. This is typically done in socializing environments, such as school, extracurricular activities, and informal interaction.
- **Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators:** Members who possess formal or informal authority to make decisions based off rules and make small adjustments when conflicts arise. Examples include judges, parents, clergy, and chieftains.
- **Rule Enforcers:** Individuals or groups who possess the ability to enforce rules, and are authorized by someone who sees themselves as a *rule maker*. Examples include militias, police (overt and secret), political commissars, death squads, jailers, and parents.

### Enablers of Social Control

- **Generation of Revenue:** Social Controlling groups depend on portions of resources produced by other members to compensate Rule Makers, Teachers, Interpreters, Adjudicators, and Enforcers for their services. These resources are usually gained in the form of a tax, and are paid in currency or commodity (food, manpower, supplies, crops). Revenue is also a critical enabler in attaining good relations with neighboring social controlling elements.
- **Information management & Legitimacy:** Through rule enforcers, rule makers can coerce the population and establish social control at the expense of other FSS portions. However, if they use information gain popular legitimacy, they can co-opt the population and exert social control.
- **Neighborly Relations:** Once control is established, a group must maintain stable relations with their neighboring groups. If not, they will become vulnerable to overt and covert attacks on their ability to control.

Figure 10. Essential Elements and Enablers of Social Control

*Source:* Developed by author.

The Fundamentals of Social Stability are generally comprised of the majority of needs or contributors to needs satisfaction listed in figure 3, with the exception of spiritual safety. However, two particular needs identified in figure 3 are not included in this thesis, “Political Organization” and “Sleep.”

Malinowski argued that political organization is essential to the proper function of society. Doyal and Gough also argued that there must be some form of political authority, with the means to impose sanctions that ensure rules associated with needs satisfaction are learned and followed.<sup>69</sup> Although representative governments are the best form of

authority, they may not work in areas that do not have a tradition of peaceful transition of authority, or other demographic reasons. While the preconditions enabling the success and longevity of representative governments are debatable, this thesis only focuses on the presence of an effective government that can protect its citizenry from harm, regardless of its form. The existence of political organizations that represent the effected population, while noble, is of less importance.

Many will argue that Sleep will happen when an individual is truly in need of it, sometimes against one's will. Dr. Corning argues for the inclusion of a sleep need, as the absence of it will inhibit the individual's ability to function as a member of society in a cultural acceptable manner by limiting their production, or at worst, causing death to themselves or others through accident. However, Corning encompasses this description of proper function under his definition of health. Truly, if someone lacks the ability to sleep (whether due to poor health or external influences), is this not a form of harm, since it inhibits the proper function of the body and pursuit of needs satisfaction? Furthermore, because the individual is harmed by a lack of sleep, they no longer enjoy the precondition of relatively good health necessary to pursue basic needs fulfillment. Therefore, this thesis considers Sleep a health issue, and the ability to correct sleep-related flaws as part of the access to Medical Care need, as it exists in the United States in the form of sleep clinics, etc.

At this point, the identification of the Fundamentals of Social Stability establishes a framework to analyze how other groups and organizations approached post-conflict stabilization. In the Smart Practices of Stability Operations we will use the FSS as a lens

to measure needs-satisfaction success in historical examples and the methods in which stakeholders attained such fulfillment.

### Smart Practices of Stability Operations

By studying relevant historical experiences, we acknowledge that certain TTPs may possess enduring utility, as evidenced by current success in post-Surge Iraqi capacity-building. This study focuses on how respective groups and organizations did so within an operational context. After identifying “smart” practices through the lens of the FSS, we then deduce whether these solutions are situation-specific or have enduring validity; if they are the latter, we include them as part of the Pillars of Stability Operations.

As Social Control is a vital portion of ensuring FSS-fulfillment, special attention is given to how “Rules” were serviced by analyzing the existence of the Essential Elements and Enablers of Social Control in each case study. Other measures of FSS-fulfillment are viewed in terms of initial issues preventing their satisfaction, what was done to correct these, and any consequences of these actions.

### The Philippine Insurrection

The United States took a progressive approach to pacifying the Philippine Insurrection. Unique to this situation was the decision by the U.S. Government to retain the islands as a protectorate rather than grant them independence, in an attempt to keep them from falling under the reign of the fledgling German or Japanese Empires.

Driver of Instability in the Philippines focused around Tertiary causes related to groups’ claims to social control. In this case, after the defeat of the Spanish, the

Insurrectos under Aguinaldo believed they would become independent, only to have the American Government under President McKinley choose otherwise. This issue of perceived colonialism could be considered an SDI related to Freedoms. However, with the capture of Aguinaldo and McKinley's reelection in 1902, the Insurrecto movement significantly lost effectiveness. Moro leadership was also driven by Tertiary causes. However, they attempted to persuade their population to revolt, claiming that American-enacted reforms were attempts by the U.S. to "Christianize" them (a Secondary Driver of Instability). This was quickly refuted, as the Americans overtly professed they were doing nothing of the sort.

Figure 11 depicts how these themes enabled needs-fulfillment of the population in the course of the operation against the Filipino Insurrectos.

Need	Issue preventing fulfillment	How did intervening forces fix the void?	Long-term consequences effecting fulfillment	Additional fixes... and consequences
<b>Metabolism (needs 1-4)</b>	Urban areas have squalid living conditions	Public health projects in urban areas focused on sanitation.	Zones of protection threatened popular health with increased pop. density and decreased sanitation in urban areas. Attacks on Insurrecto food sources effect population as well. Zones disrupt Commissariat cycle and food sources.	Moro crops destroyed during punitive expeditions under Wood.
<b>Safety</b>	Only security apparatus that existed to fill the void left by the Spanish was Insurrecto-led. Populations were vulnerable to rule of insurgents when U.S. forces were not present.	Policy of "Chatizement": Development of "zones of protection", attacks on insurgent infrastructure, combat operations against Insurrecto columns, development of native constabulary, population relocated and consolidated in secure areas.	Allegations of abuse by U.S. personnel. Zones threaten wellbeing as illness is spread rampant in camps. Villagers moved from cultural base to zones, effecting spiritual safety. Moros see compliance with Wood's reforms as anti-Islamic.	Women & children killed due to proximity to Moro fighters. Destruction of social fabric and Moro leader illegitimacy results in large loss of life at Bud Dajo in 1906. U.S. disavowal of efforts to "Christianize" calms Moros. Bliss' growth of native security forces increases safety.
<b>Thermoregulation</b>	Fulfilled by population	Fulfilled by population	Villages burned when move to "zones" occur - deny supplies to enemy.	Wood's punitive expeditions burn Moro houses
<b>Medical Care</b>	Instability reduces ability of inhabitants to access medical care in urban areas	Public health projects in urban areas: vaccination campaigns, hospitals built.	Limited and primitive health care system in rural areas overwhelmed by problems caused by moves to zones.	U.S. immunization efforts in zones to combat disease outbreaks. Efforts to improve Moro health care.
<b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>	Legacy of Spanish colonialism created a caste system and lack of mobility. Slavery still allowed.	Social mobility is hindered when U.S. turns to native elites to fill leadership voids. Slavery abolished under Wood.	Abolishment of slavery and legal codes considered archaic opens some additional options for MAMs.	Effects of haves and have-nots still felt in region today.
<b>Social Participation</b>	Lack of education opportunities for average Filipinos	Schools built and manned by U.S. civilian volunteers	Movement of population to zones uproots social fabrics; education and other interactions disrupted.	Non-interference with Islam preserves some assemblance of social participation and order.
<b>Adaptation</b>				
<b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b>	Disruption of agricultural growth cycles and ability to transport goods to and from market.	Infrastructure improvements and road networks. Security provided along major LOCs	Relocation of population to zones of protection further disrupts Economic System.	Infrastructure improvements positively effects trade and movement of goods. Bliss grows constabulary & Philippine Scouts.
<b>Social Control</b>	Lack of central authority after defeat of Spain. Insurrecto parallel gov't. structure controls rural areas. U.S. forces fail to gain effective support because they cannot secure areas long-term, negating the effects of population-centric projects. Moro legal code deemed "uncivilized".	Customs and duties collected by U.S. forces. Soldiers run local/regional governments until elections are held. Existing cultural apparatus is leveraged to produce government leaders. Attacks on Insurrecto social control infrastructure. Moro legal code replaced by American-style model. Spanish-era tax reinstated for Filipino gov't revenue.	Insurrecto infrastructure critically damaged. Native-led governance spreads to rural areas. Courts prosecute Insurrectos and criminals - legitimizing the Filipino government. Abolishment of slavery and Moro legal code strikes at power base of <i>datu</i> s - many Moros take up arms against Americans. Other Moros see social changes as attempts to "Christianize". U.S. frequently disavows efforts to convert Muslims.	Wood's punitive expeditions against Moros. Targeting of Moro leaders breaks down Moro social order. Other Moro groups respond to rumor of punitive expeditions; Mindinao largely pacified by 1906. Demonstration of willingness to use force suppresses indigenous urges to resist further after 1911.

Figure 11. FSS-Fulfillment in the Philippines

*Source:* Developed by author with information from Charles Byler, "Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 42-45; Donald E. Klingner and L. R. Jones, "Learning from the Philippine Occupation: Nation-Building and other Institutional Development in Iraq and Other High Security Risk Nations," *Public Administration and Development* 25, (2005): 151; Robert D. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1901-1902*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2007, (reprinted 2008), 133-4, 121.

Critical themes from The Philippine Insurrection were a dedicated focus on fulfilling the basic needs of the population, and improving the indigenous capacity to do so long term, in an effort to gain popular support against the Insurrectos. This occupied a significant amount of U.S. resources throughout the campaign. Complimenting these precursors to today's stability lines of operation were lethal operations against Insurrecto

formations. These had a combined effect of tactically defeating insurgent forces while denying them the critical civilian infrastructure needed to reconstitute. An essential element to this synchronization is the importance of “near simultaneity” in the execution of lethal efforts designed at defeating insurgent forces and population-focused tasks to improve quality of life.<sup>70</sup> Intervening forces must possess the ability to quickly follow the tactical defeat of insurgent forces with stability-driven actions to gain the favor of the population (or deny them to the enemy, at a minimum).<sup>71</sup> Driving the tempo of this “Cycle of Counter-insurgency Operations”<sup>72</sup> allows forces to access intelligence that enables the further destruction of insurgent infrastructure, which in turn allows for further execution of stability tasks in newly secured areas, as seen in figure 12.




Figure 12. The Cycle of Counterinsurgency Operations

Source: Developed by author.

Another enduring theme of this operation is the use of existing indigenous institutions to achieve social control and stability in a timely fashion. Although this leveraged cultural leaders and elites formerly in power under the Spanish, it may actually have perpetuated the lack of fulfillment of an individual's need for social Mobility and Access. Regardless, it lead to quicker stabilization in areas this technique was employed in. This familiarity with governance decreased the chances that attempts at governance were poorly executed and viewed as illegitimate and/or forced on the population (as today's attempts at democratization are viewed in many areas). Because the lack of social

mobility and access fulfillment is an SDI, improvements in the satisfaction of this need (through democratic elections and other forms of representation) can be instituted gradually.

Also critical to the mission was the ability to use emerging communications technology (telegraph) to issue and reinforce guidance, especially in a confusing operational environment that was constantly scrutinized by a skeptical press. While it didn't prevent allegations of heavy-handedness and abuse, it did significantly decrease their probability. This new technology was also used to provide an element of transparency to the population, regarding clear expectations and requirements for their behavior and how they were expected to interact with suspected insurgents.

An example of "what not to do" is the use of forced population movements into "Zones of Protection." While securing the population from insurgent influence (and denying population support to the insurgent) is vital to the fulfillment of needs, forced uprooting and relocation has an extremely disruptive effect on the Economic System of Needs Satisfier Production. Such extreme measures particularly effect the Commissariat sub-cycle, as well sacrificing the medical care portion of the Security Cycle in an attempt to benefit the population by physically protecting them from insurgent influence.

Another example of "what not to do" was the punitive expeditions against the Moros led by Major General Leonard Wood. In response to renewed resistance, Wood's forces killed hundreds of Moros (including women and children), burned villages, and destroyed crops. Additionally, the losses incurred by the Moro leadership effectively eroded their social order. This led to the vastly one-sided battle of Bud Dajo, where Moro leadership, severely attrited from fighting and seen as illegitimate by Wood's

abolishment of Moro legal codes, was unable to persuade the defenders of Bud Dajo to leave in an effort to save their families.<sup>73</sup>

Although Wood's desires to restructure the Moro legal code were progressive in nature, he should have considered the overall effect on social order. In this case, the Filipino government did not have control over all portions of the islands, and Moro leadership could have potentially been leveraged to add a layer of control and overall stability. Once Wood enacted his reforms, he lost the chance to leverage Moro elders, and more importantly, opened the door for unstable behavior on the part of younger Moro MAMs who saw their elders as illegitimate and incapable of preserving their autonomy and way of life. This spiraled into an uprising. This situation is an appreciation for the delicate balance of transitioning from one social control apparatus to another.

U.S. Army officers served as primary Rule Makers from the defeat of the Spanish until their turnover to civilian personnel in 1913, with the exception of William Howard Taft, who was appointed military governor in 1901.<sup>74</sup> During this time, military leadership from Otis to MacArthur, through Wood, Bliss and Pershing, enacted a large volume of reforms.<sup>75</sup> These reforms undermined the Moro social structure<sup>76</sup> that emerged to fill the gap left by the defeat of the Spanish. This breakdown of the Moro social fabric defeated a potential rule-making apparatus that already existed, and was eventually replaced by Filipino local government with the election of local leaders.

The military government and civilian population in the Philippines were able to serve as one layer of Rule Teachers and alert the population to the changes in social rules. Upon defeating the Spanish, the military government immediately began building schools and revamping educational curriculum.<sup>77</sup> Additionally, many American civilians came

over to the Philippines to teach. Finally, military leaders operated with relative transparency, using leaflets and telegraph to alert the population to rules and regulations (MacArthur's General Order 100) they were expected to abide by.<sup>78</sup>

To establish an apparatus for Rule Interpretation and Adjudication, American forces established various legal reforms designed to aid in the transparent processing of criminal issues, including courts. The Moros also had existing legal systems, but were undermined by the legal reforms enacted by Wood, and U.S. officials overturning legal decisions by the Moro Datus (leaders). This, paired with an inability to enforce legal rulings, eroded Moro legitimacy.<sup>79</sup>

Rule Enforcement started out as a heavily American responsibility. However, as the American forces quickly realized they could not secure the whole area themselves, they quickly began recruiting and training native forces. These units included a large Philippine Constabulary and the Army's Philippine Scouts. Eventually, U.S. leadership recognized that expanding the coverage of native forces, in addition to their tactical integration with U.S. units, was vital to demonstrating Filipino government reach into rural areas and defeating any claims to control that Moro leaders had.<sup>80</sup>

### Vietnam

Drivers of Instability in Vietnam were Tertiary, centered around the VC/VCIs desire to overthrow the GVN and install a communist state attached to North Vietnam. In fact, no real violations of individual basic needs were prevalent until the VC began increasing their operations in the south. Much of their propaganda and attempts at cajoling the population into an uprising were unsuccessful, as referenced by the large amount of popular ambivalence and inaction seen in the south after the Tet Offensive.<sup>81</sup>

Earlier pacification efforts undertaken by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) include the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet Programs. Both were largely ineffective. In many cases, especially due to the habit of the GVN to uproot populations and move them into areas easier to secure, these efforts served the Viet Cong (VC) propaganda effort more than any other goal.<sup>82</sup> This inability to protect the population from VC terror and provide basic services perpetuated an overall ambivalence amongst the population; many swayed with whatever force currently occupied their area.<sup>83</sup>

These programs were followed by the Rural Development Cadre (RD) program, which sought to reestablish the link between the rural areas and the GVN, in addition to dramatically increasing infrastructure and overall quality of life. However, the laundry list of tasks assigned to RD teams and the inability to secure areas from VC attacks resulted in minimal effects on pacification.<sup>84</sup> This failure led to the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), which sought to oversee and coordinate all civilian-led pacification programs in South Vietnam. While a step in the right direction, the OCO lacked authority to control respective agencies and came into frequent clashes with the CIA and Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) on the subject of who controlled overall pacification.<sup>85</sup>

In the spring of 1967, in response to the disjointedness that plagued U.S. military and civilian efforts in South Vietnam and special advisor to the President Robert Komar's recommendations, President Johnson instituted National Security Action Memorandum 362. This effectively created Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).<sup>86</sup> With CORDS, MACV sought to integrate traditional and ongoing pacification efforts with major combat operations in the South Vietnamese countryside.

At the MACV staff-level, CORDS' greatest accomplishment was the integration of military and civilian personnel, achieving a unity of command and effort within the staff construct. This mix of personnel was also pushed down to provincial and district advisory teams, achieving a synergistic effect similar to that at MACV and enabling greater success in overall pacification.<sup>87</sup> The benefits of this combined military and civilian approach were founded in the recognition that the solution to South Vietnamese instability was not just a military issue, but one of GVN capacity as well. Although the security situation had to improve before other infrastructure and societal development could be sustained, military operations, governance initiatives, and humanitarian improvements could not be “stove-piped.” Instead, CORDS recognized that they must be executed in conjunction, not in sequence.

CORDS achieved this jointness by consolidating existing programs from previous pacification efforts, and combining them with new initiatives under one over-arching headquarters. This combination fostered improvements in rural infrastructure, social welfare, education, agro-business, the reach of national and provincial governance, and the effectiveness of GVN and local security forces. CORDS also recognized the struggle between the GVN and Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) amongst the South Vietnamese population for who could best exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence. This led to the empowerment of the “Open Hands” movement, designed to turn VC with deception appeals, and the implementation of the Phoenix program, which targeted the targeted VCI infrastructure.<sup>88</sup>

In response to the pacification losses incurred during Tet,<sup>89</sup> the MACV staff recognized that VC propaganda gains and personnel losses must be met with a renewed

offensive and implemented the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The APC sought to regain all of the previous years' results under CORDS by focusing on the improving local security and infrastructure through the expansion of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF), police, and local self-defense groups. CORDS also reinvigorated Phoenix and "Open Arms," resettled refugees, and fostered GVN and local government provision of services in rural areas.<sup>90</sup> These efforts resulted in major gains, including an additional 4 million personnel added to local area security forces, and reduction of monetary, food, and manpower taxes taken from villages by the VCI.<sup>91</sup> This coupled with GVN improvements like the Land to Tiller Act, which put land under the ownership of those who farmed it, led to at least 93 percent<sup>92</sup> of South Vietnam being considered "pacified" by the end of 1970.<sup>93</sup>

However effective CORDS, and the programs it oversaw, were under the APC, the gains were short-lived. The destruction of the VCI and resulting pacification panicked the North Vietnamese into launching the 1972 Easter Offensive. While the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was successful, in part due to the help of U.S. advisors and airpower, it became obvious that rampant corruption in the GVN and ARVN hierarchy were undoing all that CORDS could effect.<sup>94</sup> Additionally, the U.S. trained and equipped an army that was not correctly developed to meet the hybrid internal and external threats posed by the VC and North Vietnam, as both the Pentagon and the GVN expected continued U.S. support after the completion of Vietnamization. This problem was exacerbated by the GVN's inability to maintain such an expensive and highly technical military without external aid.<sup>95</sup>

CORDS itself didn't really add any new programs other than Phoenix and "Open Arms," but it did provide the near-simultaneity between lethal and non-lethal actions that multiplied the effects of existing efforts and operations. In terms of effecting South Vietnamese social control, CORDS influenced the following essentials of *social control*:

CORDS attempted to leverage RVN Rule Makers by placing governance advisors down to the provincial level.<sup>96</sup> This structure allowed for close collaboration between U.S. governance advisors and provincial chiefs, as well as synchronization between U.S. governance and military advisors within a respective area. At the national level, the Land to Tiller Act, overall increased security, and other improvements led to increased GVN influence and credibility with the rural population.<sup>97</sup> However, other reform opportunities were not undertaken that could have further eroded the Communists' political agenda.<sup>98</sup> This, paired with the continued corruption of those who were supposed to make and enforce rules within South Vietnamese society served to undermine the social fabric itself,<sup>99</sup> eventually undoing all CORDS-related gains, RVN government to regional leadership and from the ARVN to the RF/PF. At the time that the North Vietnamese invaded in 1975, such decay meant that the military operation was simply a *fait accompli*. In the end, not effort by stability operators could overcome the fact that those who were supposed to make the rules were among the most frequent violators of those rules.

In other situations where corruption leads to the illegitimacy of a ruling group, a traditional authority will usually emerge to reestablish some form of order. This did occur in many areas of Vietnam, as other forms of control (religious or family) were typically targeted by the VCI and replaced with communist personnel.<sup>100</sup>

To effect the capability of Rule Teachers, USAID undertook the increase of school construction in the Vietnamese countryside during previous pacification operations. With the advent of CORDS, this was done in conjunction with security operations as well. Additionally, the interconnectedness of CORDS saw improvements in education curriculum in addition to an increase in the volume of schools.<sup>101</sup>

Official GVN courts, or Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators, received mixed reviews. Transparently, the GVN established special laws called An Tri that protected against false accusations and arrests.<sup>102</sup> Conversely, in some instances the legal system proved unable to process the volume of arrests made under the Phoenix program, demonstrating ineptness on the part of the GVN in their failure to offer speedy trials and adjudicate wrongful and just arrests. Those who remained in jail without trial for long periods were easily poached by the Viet Cong.<sup>103</sup> Additionally, when the system did adjudicate an arrest, convicted VCI were out in no more than six years, and sometimes as little as two.<sup>104</sup> Regardless, this ability to target VC/VCI suspects, detain, and subsequently process them under an established rule of law was better for the pacification effort than the large-scale sweeps conducted by regular military units that tended to alienate the population.<sup>105</sup>

CORDS sought to effect Rule Enforcement as much as any other area. The South Vietnamese security apparatus was increased at the local, provincial, and national levels.<sup>106</sup> As noted above, this dramatic increase in resources, manpower, and instruction from U.S. advisors had significant effect until 1972, when the effects of Vietnamization and continued ARVN corruption eroded the security system from within.

The other FSS-fostering measures incorporated under CORDS, and their corresponding effects, are listed in figure 13.

Need	Issue preventing fulfillment	How did CORDS address the void?	2nd and 3rd order effects on fulfillment	RVN corruption consequences
<b>Metabolism</b>	Lack of central government control interdicts information flow; agrobusiness remains largely unchanged from centuries prior. VC taxes crop yields to feed VC.	CORDS coordinates USG efforts to improve food production: introducing large-yield rice varieties, improved agro-techniques, fish ponds. GVN implements Land to the Tiller Act; more farmers now own their farms. Farmer credit made available.	Agro output increases with pride and incentive from ownership. New technologies injected into S. Vietnamese agrobusiness. Fertilizers and pesticides made available. Food takes from VC decrease as GVN expands protection into rural areas and eliminates insurgent grip.	Agro-sector cannot compensate for effects of Dutch Disease during Vietnamization. Long term: Industrialized agro-sector victimized by 1975 loss and subsequent collectivization.
<b>Safety</b>	Intimidation used to coerce local populations away from the GVN and into the sphere of VC/VCI influence. Threats keep population fearing the "next phase of attacks".	US/GVN embarks on the APC, capitalizing on the weakened VC/VCI and populations who were brutalized during Tet. RF/PF force improvements and increased GVN force presence means better safety for locals.	"Secure" hamlets seized during Tet back under GVN control. By 1970, over 1,000 contested hamlets secured; 93% of RVN considered "pacified". RF/PF increase by 50% from '66-'71. Nat'l Police increase by 66% from '67-'71.	National Police Force undefined, undertrained, understaffed, and corrupt. ARVN is only credible security force.
<b>Thermoregulation</b>	Significant displacement of population in Tet-affected areas.	APC focuses on resettlement of refugees. USAID continues aid for IDPs.	Refugees resettled. Increased security of villages protects infrastructure. Corruption in ARVN hierarchy marginalizes "peasant" troops.	No govt housing for ARVN families effects desertions; soldiers worry about families safety during times of crisis.
<b>Medical Care</b>	Effects of Tet restricts access to clinics and care.	APC (USAID) revitalizes improvements in rural medical treatment / development.	USAID-led improvements in rural care. GVN fails to provide preventative health care to troops.	Long term: as GVN loses war in 1975, social fabric unravels.
<b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>	Civilians conscripted to serve as fighters, porters, and laborers.	Peoples Self-Defense Corps reduces draft deferments & extends terms of mil. service.	Decreased amount of recruiting by VC as GVN control expands into rural regions.	GVN cronyism creates a closed & incompetent caste system.
<b>Social Participation</b>	VC checkpoints interdict urban area movement during Tet. Teachers in "secure hamlets" targeted by VC. Many stay in homes fearing neighbors' leanings towards the VC/VCI; this cuts many off from any information.	APC provides emphasis on information coordination between GVN and population. Damaged road and electric networks repaired and expanded. USAID continues efforts in improving education infrastructure; works with GVN in curriculum modernization.	Road networks repaired and expanded. School enrollment increases. Curriculum modernized. Teachers made available to rural areas in need. Implementation of new curriculum and new school construction managed by USAID. Improved information and media dissemination from Saigon to population.	Opportunity to legitimize GVN education minister lost. Phoenix quota system for neutralized VCI, set by GVN, drives some provincial and district chiefs to make indiscriminate arrests.
<b>Adaptation</b>				
<b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b>	GVN officials and security forces targeted by VC during Tet; many fail to return to work and hide. Interdicted infrastructure effects transport of goods. Many residents of "secure hamlets" stay home instead of returning to work for fear of VC. VC tax newly seized areas for food, money, manpower.	APC focuses on measures designed to revitalize the economy; and programs under it inject money into the development sector. Elimination of VC/VCI threat increases economic possibilities due to lack of security threat.	Reduced VCI presence = reduced taxes on populations. RF/PF increase 50% from 1966-71. Nat'l Police increase 66% from 1967-71. Huge U.S. force presence and development aid creates unsustainable "bubble cycles" in the Econ. System. These have the effect of "Dutch Disease"; lure of money draws those in less lucrative professions away from other cycles of the Econ. System, decreasing their vitality.	S. Vietnamese economy unable to recover from bubble burst of Vietnamization when U.S. force presence and S leaves the Econ. System. Vital cycles in the Econ. System cannot absorb influx of newly unemployed labor. GVN corruption and GDP cannot sustain size of security forces.
<b>Social Control</b>	Actions during Tet are focused on destroying GVN ability to govern the populace in cities and surrounding areas. VC/VCI live among population, enabling them to separate the people from GVN control. GVN ID cards destroyed. RF/PF forces sustain losses.	"New Life Development". APC improves RF/PFs, reforms local govt., and implements "Open Arms". GVN institutes General Mobilization Law; all men 18-38 are eligible for military. Peoples Self-Defense Corps reduces draft deferments & extends terms of service. Phoenix targets VCI. GVN conducts local govt. elections.	General Mobilization Law gives priority of recruitment to ARVN - at expense of Nat'l Police. CORDS / Phoenix leveraged RF/PF, Nat'l Police, PSDF, and PRU, in addition to regular U.S. forces, adding to GVN legitimacy and minimizing collateral damage villages. By 1970, APC secured 1,000 contested hamlets; 93% of S. Vietnam considered "pacified".	GVN failed to address primary grievances of insurgency; maintaining a perception of illegitimacy. Police corruption compromises pacification gains. Courts fail to speedily adjudicate trials. GVN forces never wean off U.S. firepower.

Figure 13. FSS-Fulfillment in Vietnam under CORDS

Source: Developed by author with information from Dale Andrade and LtCol James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army (Ret), Ph.D., "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (March-April, 2006): 15-17, 20-22; Matthew D. Pinard, "The American and South Vietnamese Pacification Efforts During the Vietnam War" (Master's thesis, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2002), 58-61, 113; Victoria Pohle, "The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive" (Monograph, Rand, January 1969), 21-25, 32; Angela Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shulka, "Money In the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations" (Monograph, Rand, 2007), 31, 34-37; Major Gordon M. Wells, U.S. Army, "No More Vietnams: CORDS as a Model for Counterinsurgency Campaign Design" (Monograph, U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 21-23.

Interestingly, as the GVN were trying to exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence, so were the VC/VCI.<sup>107</sup> Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive, the VCI exerted influence in lieu of the GVN by building schools and free clinics, implementing land reform, lowering taxes, and securing the local population against non-political crime. In combating the GVN's efforts to extend their reach,<sup>108</sup> and during the Tet Offensive, the VC/VCI showed restraint in many areas by using selective intimidation methods designed to coerce those who needed it without alienating the rest of the population.<sup>109</sup> This restraint shows an appreciation for a population's "tipping point" where brutality in rule enforcement and the exertion of control can push a population away from the group and into their enemy's sphere of influence. In a further attempt to win legitimacy, the VC/VCI even held elections in some of their newly "liberated" areas.<sup>110</sup>

A detrimental effect of such a mammoth and long U.S. presence in South Vietnam was how it effected the native Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production. By 1970, the large amount of U.S. defense-related spending<sup>††††</sup> amounted to close to 30 percent of South Vietnam's GDP (adjusted).<sup>111</sup> This huge volume of demand caused by aid-related construction and individual spending caused the creation of a new cycle in the Economic System, with spinoff and related employment as well. However, this lucrative new cycle in the economic system was an artificiality, as it was only related to the Security cycle in the Economic System, and was not sustainable after the departure of U.S. personnel and aid. This was a result of the lure of defense-related spending profits; instead of entrepreneurial Vietnamese nationals staking their efforts in a more sustainable

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<sup>††††</sup>On pg. 310, Hoan explains "defense-related spending" as money injected from individual U.S. military, U.S. civil, and contracted personnel spending, purchases of services from Vietnamese nationals, and purchases of local goods.

(and potentially less lucrative) sector like the Commissariat, masses of labor and merchants were drawn into the Security-related Economic Cycle. This stunted growth in other Cycles and created a large bubble of taxable labor that could not be absorbed into other areas of the Economic System after America's departure from Vietnam.

### Somalia

Somalia provides insight into how traditional structures morph to fill the void left by the state after it collapses, or when it is weak or ineffective. Interestingly, Somalia is frequently referred to as a “lawless” state. In fact, it enjoys law and enforcement at both the clan and warlord level. Unfortunately, both have legitimacy issues and neither is powerful enough to consolidate control. Regardless, Somali society has still adapted to ensure basic needs fulfillment within this construct, to the point where Somalia is a major trade force in the region.<sup>112</sup>

After the departure of U.S. and U.N. forces in 1994, warlord infighting continued in Somalia until the death of Mohammed Farah Aidid in 1996, the subsequent ousting of his tribe from Mogidishu, and their final defeat in 1999.<sup>113</sup> However, as no one group was able to eliminate opposition and consolidate power, the situation in the southern and central part of the country quickly congealed to expose the ever-present clan-based social control network of rules, known as the “Xeer.” This baseline of order existed through the colonial rule of the Italians, Said Barre’s regime, and the chaos of the Somali civil war.<sup>114</sup> Somali social structure was able to establish order amid this chaos because it was possessed the Essential Elements and Enablers of Social Control.

The Rule Makers of Somali society are the “Oday.” These clan elders primarily exist to ensure needs-satisfying resources for all. They do this by simultaneously acting

as legislator (known as the “Diya”),<sup>115</sup> judge, and executor in the application of the Xeer. However, a perception of corruption surrounds the Oday as a whole, as many were corrupted first by the Colonials, followed by the Barre regime, and finally by private financiers after the end of the civil war.<sup>116</sup> In effect, this perceived corruption limits the overall reach of the Oday, allowing other groups (private business, warlords, and radical Islam) to influence society.

In addition to the Rule Interpretation and Adjudication powers resident within the Oday, Islamic Shari'a courts served as a more formal and legitimate layer of law. The layers of law were able to coexist as the Xeer was focused more on dispute resolution between groups, while Koranic law dealt more with issues between individuals.<sup>117</sup> This relationship had a favorable effect on the conduct of business in the region,<sup>118</sup> as it established a recognized method of contract enforcement that facilitated internal and external trade.<sup>119</sup> Some urban centers even have courts funded by private businessmen.<sup>120</sup>

Rule Teaching focused on non-traditional education of the Xeer. As a result of the lack of a central government, formal education and associated socialization declined steadily with the overall literacy rate.

Rule Enforcement is accomplished through the Oday leveraging leaders of a particular “Mag,” or clan cohort, to police itself in accordance with the rules set forth by the Xeer. The Mag is responsible to abide by rulings and uses its collective resources to compensate victims as required by legal rulings. Belonging to a Mag is essentially an insurance policy, as one may not be able to pay a victim themselves and thus needs others’ resources to help. The deterrent in the Xeer system is that an individual does not want to be on the wrong side of the Xeer, for if they frequently are, the Mag will soon tire

of paying for their transgressions with their own resources and will force the individual out; leaving them without any protections and benefits of Mag membership.<sup>121</sup> Many clans also have militias that serve to protect clan members within their designated territories. Rules were also enforced by private sector militias, many of which worked for particular warlords and were later hired in 1999 through Islamic charities to enforce Sharia rulings in Mogadishu.<sup>122</sup>

Figure 14 details how Somali society went about fulfilling the FSS after the end of the civil war, and the consequences of these methods.

As we know now, Somalia is again embroiled in a situation where numerous powers continue to compete for control. This occurred as a result of the corruption of the Oday and a subsequent delegitimization of the clan system and the Xeer. An additional factor in the undermining of the traditional stability mechanism was the changing economic dynamics, where the formerly pastoral domination began to give way to an influx in telecommunications, media,<sup>123</sup> light manufacturing, and the service industry.<sup>124</sup> This changed the social fabric of the Mag groups, causing a rift between Mag membership and their leaders and eventually reinforcing the loss of confidence in the rulings of the Oday.<sup>125</sup>

Need	Issue preventing fulfillment	How did Somali society fix the void?	2nd and 3rd order effects on fulfillment	Oday corruption consequences
<b>Metabolism</b>	Food used as a weapon during Somali civil war. Droughts & return of IDPs in early '90s further effects food supply. Lack of social control disrupts agrobusiness. Oday and warlords control most water.	Remittance-funded and/or clan-based social insurance helps families meet gaps in needs-fulfillment. Islamic charities are able to compensate for the lack of social welfare systems. Reemergence of the Xeer fosters resource cooperation in the pastoral industry. Private sector fills void of central government in managing utilities.	Large increase in access to improved sanitation. Increase in overall access through private sector management. Good rains increases overall food security. Large volumes of food aid continue to fill gaps in needs-fulfillment.	Increased clan corruption restricts farmers' ability to harvest their crops causing instability in food markets. Increased violence effects aid workers and their ability to distribute food aid.
<b>Safety</b>	Somalis civil war leaves civilians vulnerable as warlords compete for power.	Xeer outlaws physical harm and emerges as the dispute resolution mechanism for Somalis. Fear of being excluded from a Mag group is primary deterrent of violence.	Life expectancy increases by five years after fall of Barre gov't. Those who don't belong to the Mag, or only belong to a minority clan experience marginalization.	As Oday loses legitimacy and Xeer system begins to lose control, instances unresolved of attacks rises.
<b>Thermoregulation</b>	Looters in urban areas strip structures bare of resources.	Xeer prohibits looting & protects property. Sharia provides additional layer of order.	N/A	Weakened Xeer-based control causes property insecurity.
<b>Medical Care</b>	Unrest causes 70% decrease in hospitals by 1995. Warlords restrict access to clinics.	Clan systems ensure children, women, and elderly (in major clans) are given care. 80% of medical care occurs in private sector.	Those not in major clans must pay for affiliation, allowing access to care. NGO medical interventions largely ineffective due to clans.	Lack of trained medical specialists limit the quality and effectiveness of care.
<b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>	Civil war disrupts all aspects of society, including trade and education, making quality of life improvement next to impossible.	Reemergence of kinship system under the Xeer stabilizes Somalia for those who belong to clans and/or Mags.	Patron-client relationship emerges where people at the bottom of society are dependent on membership and/or payments to a clan in order to achieve mobility.	Reemergence of corruption in the clan-system restricts overall freedoms. Increase in displacement of weak groups.
<b>Social Participation</b>	Somali state under Barre attempted to eradicate "clanism", undermining traditional interaction.	Clan-based society fills void left by central gov't. Large spike in number of media outlets. Clan-based education instituted. Internet and telecommunications industry (free of Barre gov't) rapidly expands. Islamic organizations provide social services.	Powerful clans and Mags fare well under kinship system. Minority clans and groups are vulnerable to abuse and/or corruption; must pay larger clans for protection and access. Education is non-"traditional"; focuses on Xeer. 7% enrolled in primary, secondary, or tertiary school.	Literacy rate is one of the worst in Africa - 24% in 2000.
<b>Adaptation</b>				
<b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b>	Barre gov't stifled economic growth. Insecurity during civil war turned economy into one based on looting, rather than trade and compensation. Lack of infrastructure beyond urban areas.	Lack of central gov't control turns Somalia into a "duty-free" zone. Reemergence of Xeer establishes trade based on compensation. Big business thrives and pays-off warlords, clans, and other threats. Informal money lenders emerge. Somalis keep existing currency. Expansion in communications, media, airline, service, and light manufacturing industries.	Corporations reinvest in Somalia (Coke, Sprint, etc.). Emerging private industries (education, health care, water, electric) require specialists; most Somalis lacking appropriate education. Average Somalis live in poverty. Lack of central gov't effects quality standards in livestock business, limiting int'l trade. Clan leadership stifles development. Lack of gov't involvement keep currency relatively stable. Private sector emerges as most powerful element in Somalia.	Lack of centrally established and internationally recognized standards in livestock quality, education, etc. put limits on expansion of the economy. Oday loss of credibility and control of Mag groups breaks down the Xeer system, allowing banditry to go unchecked.
<b>Social Control</b>	Central gov't dissolves; warlords begin fighting for control of vital revenue-generating areas.	Kinship-based governance, through the Xeer, reemerges as central controlling aspect in Somalia.	Kinship-based system not stable enough to dislodge militias. Oday eventually corrupted by warlords and private business; leads to loss of legitimacy and breakdown of the Xeer. Oday begins to lose control of the Mag at the expense of FSS fulfillment.	Lack of legitimacy in Oday opens door for the UIC, who is legitimized through religious credibility and ability to establish order that does not marginalize by clan.

Figure 14. FSS-Fulfillment in Somalia under the Clans

*Source:* Developed by the author with information from Joakim Gundel and Ahmed A. Omar Dharbaxo, "The Predicament of the 'Oday': The Role of Traditional Structures in Security, Rights, Law, and Development in Somalia" (monograph, Danish Refugee Council, November 2006), 6, 27-8; Ryan Ford, Benjamin Powell, and Alex Nowrasteh, "Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?," *The Independent Institute*, Working Paper no. 64 (November 30, 2006): 19, 21; Peter T. Leeson, "Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse" (Monograph, University of West Virginia, 2003), 21, 25; David Leonard, "Recreating Political Order: The Somali Systems Today," *Institute of Development Studies Working Paper* 2009, no. 316 (February, 2009): 2, 18; Bjorn Moller, "The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors," *Danish Institute for International Studies Report* no. 3 (2009): 13; Shaul Shay, *Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 73, 77, 79.

## Hamas

Hamas' stability operation after their success in the 2006 Palestinian elections somewhat parallels the other operations listed in this thesis. However, the intervening forces mentioned in the other examples either forcibly entered the unstable area, were invited in by the existing government, or existed under a state regime and emerged from state collapse to fill the power vacuum. In Hamas' case, they subverted from within.

Hamas rose to power by first addressing PDIs related to gaps in needs fulfillment. These efforts were largely conducted by the Da'wa in providing resources that allowed for the procurement of food, heating resources, materials to repair homes, and municipal projects to bring clean water and sewage removal to urban areas. Hamas' military wing addressed PDIs related to safety, as Israeli retribution strikes harmed many citizens in Gaza. By striking back, Hamas achieved legitimacy, even though their military actions can be argued as counter-productive. The Da'wa also addressed SDIs by building, staffing, and running schools in areas where existing institutions were over-crowed, or none existed at all. Hamas' campaign against the PNA was aimed at addressing TDIs related to the desire to control Gaza and overthrow a corrupt government. Their subsequent defeat of Fatah in Gaza led to Hamas finding itself in a unique position: a Sunni fundamentalist organization in charge of territory in the Middle East.<sup>126</sup> Fortunately, the Da'wa, Hamas's social wing, was already well familiar with providing for needs of the populace. Furthermore, their coffers were well stocked with donations gained through increased legitimacy throughout the Middle East.<sup>127</sup> This multi-tiered approach to address the FSS and Drivers of Instability won Hamas control of Gaza, even

in the face of international sanctions and a subsequent Israeli invasion in 2009. These efforts are detailed in figure 15.

Need	Issue preventing fulfillment	How did intervening forces fix the void?	2nd and 3rd order effects on fulfillment	Issues after <i>Cast Lead</i>	Additional fixes
<b>Metabolism</b>	Destruction of agricultural areas, loss of fishing area, and restricted access of goods leads to loss of livelihoods and price inflation.	Welfare system established by the Dawa to help those in need.	After PNA funds are frozen by Western powers in 2006, only Hamas can provide for the basic needs of Palestinians. Due to Hamas' status as a terrorist organization in the eyes of the West, Israel instituted a blockade of Gaza.	Black market and smuggling economy emerged to bring goods past the blockade from Egypt. Agribusiness shuts down during <i>Cast Lead</i> ; farms sustain damage from fighting.	Smuggling economy brings goods from Egypt, taxes to gov't. Hamas helps clear farms; distributes \$65 million in aid.
<b>Safety</b>	Israeli occupation and continued struggle for land uprooted and killed many Palestinians.	Struggle vs. Israelis establishes Hamas as only effective force in Gaza. Hamas improves existing security forces after seizing power. Hamas clerics give religious permission to MAMs for suicide missions. Pensions provided to families of "martyrs".	Young men are more willing to join and die for the cause, knowing their families will be taken care of in their absence. MAMs more willing to die for cause, believing they have religious approval.	Nearly one out of every 225 Gaza residents are killed or wounded. Schools, mosques, and clinics targeted during <i>Cast Lead</i> . Displacement and lack of shelter affects mental safety; especially in children.	Gov't police return to patrolling after ceasefire. Hamas' Al Qassam Brigade conduct internal inquiry to improve tactics.
<b>Thermoregulation</b>	Israeli actions in the second <i>intifada</i> destroyed approx. 2,500 houses in Gaza. Power plant attacked.	Relief and shelter provided to refugees and orphans.	No Change	Shelters attacked during <i>Cast Lead</i> . 70% of population displaced. Reconstruction hindered by blockade.	Homeless moved to homes vacated by Fatah, or are found vacant apartments.
<b>Medical Care</b>	Lack of volume of care and supplies	Clinics built and stocked in Gaza. Medical capacity ensured by Da'wa.	No Change	Clinics and medical workers targeted. Instances of denied access to care by Israelis.	Aid cannot completely fill gap in medical supplies.
<b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>	Israeli checkpoints limit movement in Gaza & from Gaza to Israel. Number of work permits reduced.	Hamas contributed to this void, through human rights violations and restricted freedom of expression against Fatah.	No Change	Majority of businesses shut down due to blockade. Best opportunities lie in smuggling & aid-related employment.	Rubbled roads cleared. Borders still closed.
<b>Social Participation</b>	Living under austere conditions. Many areas lack resources for permanent schools and public meeting places.	Establishment of Islamic Center, controlling education and religious activity in Gaza, as well as women's institutions, child care, sports clubs,	Created a sense of community for Palestinians. Favorable opinion of Hamas led to funding, recruits, and votes. New generations, raised on Hamas-run TV, schools, and social activities, see Hamas as the core of Palestinian society.	Schools & mosques targeted. Burden-reducing efforts on decreased livelihoods: children taken out of school to work; others married-off early to decrease amount of mouths to feed in a family.	Schools used as shelters cleared, classes resumed.
<b>Adaptation</b>					
<b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b>	Destruction of agricultural areas in the "Buffer Zone", restricted fishing access. Restricted movement and access of goods.	Hamas' Dawa mitigates starvation through handouts. After securing power in Gaza, Hamas begins tax collection and efforts undertaken to improve security forces.	Blockade restricts access of resources required for the FSS. Gaza has no port or airport; economy depends on access to Israel & Egypt. Smuggling operations begin from Egypt.	Commissariat broke down due to poor access and farm damage. Prices spiked. Infrastructure damaged.	Hamas helps farmers clear land. Establish relations with Egypt to allow flow of critical resources?
<b>Social Control</b>	Social control vacillates between occupying Israeli forces and PNA; Israelis are seen as the enemy, the PNA as corrupt and illegitimate.	Control of Gaza borders established after defeat of PNA. Existing forms of governance assumed; rather than implementing Sharia law.	Abuses during fighting between Hamas and PNA go unreported. Key personnel in law system replaced with those who are pro-Hamas. Hamas' control of Gaza led to an embargo of the area, and subsequent Israeli invasion in 2008-9.	Hamas now struggles to contain destabilizing groups, like tribes, gangs, and Al Qaeda. Public opinion of Hamas damaged by <i>Cast Lead</i> performance and inability to open borders.	Internal crackdowns against dissenters force public opinion largely underground. Smuggling tunnel traffic regulated by Gaza gov't.

Figure 15. FSS-Fulfillment in Gaza under Hamas

Source: Developed by the author with information from Suzanne Jaspars, Susan O'Callaghan, and Sara Pavanello, *Losing Ground: Protection and Livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2009), 34, 38-42; Congressional Research Service, "Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009)," *CRS Report to Congress* (19 February 2009): 13-15; Michael Keene, "Social Justice Initiatives As A Legitimizing Force As Seen In Hamas And Hezbollah," *Rivier Academic Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 3; Colonel Ben-Zion Mehr, IDF, *Hamas—How has a Terrorist Organization Become a Political Power?* (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2008): 14, 17-18, 22-23.

Critical to Hamas' seizure of power was their leverage of the Essential Enabler of Social Control, "Information Management and Legitimacy," whether through armed struggle against Israeli and Fatah, discrediting the PNA as corrupt and illegitimate,<sup>128</sup> or social work conducted by the Da'wa.<sup>129</sup> Hamas also used information operations to attract new generations of followers, through the internet and television.<sup>130</sup> However, figure 15 also depicts the difficulties for Hamas as they try to govern Gaza.

Hamas and Gaza were physically isolated from the rest of the world, with the exception of those smugglers who are able to evade the Israeli Navy and checkpoints or follow a tunnel across the Egyptian border. This effects the flow of resources and creates huge challenges for Hamas as they try to consolidate power and provide for the needs of the population. The embargo of Gaza has restricted vast amounts of resource movement, and smugglers and aid workers are unable to completely fill the void.

Part of the problem is the way in which Hamas has established control. The fallout of the putsch against the PNA was a limit of rights and freedoms of Gazans as Hamas systematically eliminated opposition. However, this attempt at establishing social control only succeeded in restricting the freedoms and mobility of average inhabitants, as various fringe groups (including Al Qaeda), tribes, and warlords all continue to erode Hamas' grip.<sup>131</sup> Gaza is also shorthanded by geography. It has no port or airport,<sup>132</sup> requiring all critical resources to come from Israel or Egypt.

The blockade of Gaza also caused a major upheaval in Gaza's economic system of needs-satisfier production. Previously, Gaza enjoyed trade between Israel, Egypt, and Europe. Farmers grew and sent seasonal cash crops to Europe and were dependent on the large profit yields to make ends meet.<sup>133</sup> However, when these outlets were no longer

accessible, farmers lost the specialty crops they produced in 2008-09, as the same demand did not exist inside of Gaza. In this case, the crops grown in the agricultural sector prior to the blockade reflected the demand inside and out of Gaza. When the blockade denied use of established trade conduits leading out of Gaza, the economic system's nature changed from international to internal of Gaza. Farmers were caught one growing season behind, as their plantings reflected the economic demand of the pre-blockade system, causing economic catastrophe for many, and forcing them into the typical in-extremis habits of those desperate to meet the basic needs of those they're responsible for. Such measures include selling livestock for food-procuring cash (and driving down the price of livestock in the process).

The issues that ensued since the embargo of Gaza and the Israeli's Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9 serve to weaken the support Hamas built over the past decade through their ability to fill gaps needs fulfillment. Not only are they failing in ensuring the FSS in Gaza, but in many cases, organizations of the international development community are the only ones who can bring in the supplies necessary to fix some of these immediate issues.<sup>134</sup> This further degrades the prestige and support Hamas rose to power through, as they are not able to project the same aura of FSS-fostering competence.

“Shocks” to the Gaza economic system also caused the rise of new cycles. The first, “Smuggling,” is the ability to transport in-demand resources past the blockade created a new occupation niche in Gaza. The second, “Aid,” reflects the necessity aid fills in the Gazan economic system, as the majority of the population now depends on some amount of handout for survival.<sup>135</sup> These are depicted in figures 16 and 17.




Figure 16. Uniqueness of the Gaza Economic System  
*Source:* Developed by author.



Figure 17. Gaza Smuggling and Aid Cycles in the Economic System  
*Source:* Developed by author.

These two emergency-response cycles, which do not occupy the same stature in a stable society's economic system, still interact with more typical and critical cycles of Security and Education and Training inside an environment of rules laid forth by a social controlling element.

Smugglers follow internally established *rules*, as well as guidelines of compensation that exist within a black market atmosphere. They typically abide by the bribing policies of officials who "turn a blind eye" to their activities. Aid workers also follow rules, although theirs are typically viewed as more legitimate. Additionally, they have many more layers of rules to follow. Internally, they set mandates and parameters that guide the focus of their interventions. In order to implement these plans, they must conform with, or treat with subtlety, the rules of the area they are intervening in. If not, they risk being thrown out of the area and becoming unable to effect the situation at all. Aid organizations must also follow informal rules set by their donors, as they may lose financial support if they engage in activities their donors don't agree with.

Both aid workers and smugglers need Security in order to conduct business. In situations where social control breaks down, smugglers need the ability to protect themselves and their livelihoods, whether through lethal action, or bribes. Aid workers need access for their personnel and supplies in order to conduct their work. Additionally, they need recognition of their neutral status by belligerents and other groups.

Without some combination of informal and formal Education and Training, smugglers and aid workers will be largely ineffective. Smugglers learn techniques for gathering information that enables evasion of authorities and other groups that seek to interdict their activities. There is also a business management aspect to smuggling and

operating within the black market that enables one to understand appropriate and feasible rates for compensation and bribery. Without this, a smuggler's business fails the same as a legitimate businessman, with more harmful consequences. Aid workers also learn techniques for information gathering and analysis that enable them to appropriately target vulnerable areas. This is enhanced by formal education (sustainable development, international relations, economics, etc.), experience, and networking.

In Gaza, after the defeat of the PA, Hamas emerged as the primary Rule Makers of the region. Due to their social work through the Da'wa, political victory in 2006, subsequent vilification and defeat of the PNA, and their prowess in fighting Israel, the Palestinian people viewed Hamas as legitimate. Additionally, many clerics (the same who sanctioned terrorist/martyr attacks against Israel) legitimized Hamas with their approval.

Rule Teaching was already firmly in place in Gaza at three levels. The first was at the home, through informal interactions with parents and through watching Hamas run television. The second occurred at school run by the Da'wa, where social participation teaches acceptable behaviors. The third was through Islam itself, which Hamas professes a support for Sharia Law.

Because Hamas advocates Sharia Law, the Islamic clergy serves as the Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators.

#### International Aid Response in Gaza

International organizations are no stranger to the various areas inhabited by Palestinians. Some, like the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine, have been in place and working with Palestinians since 1949.<sup>136</sup> The

international aid community increased their presence in Gaza after Operation Cast Lead and addressed PDIs related to food and clean water insecurity, damaged waste removal infrastructure, an overwhelmed medical care apparatus, and the threat of exposure from damaged homes, shelters, and camps.<sup>137</sup> Some aid personnel even found themselves addressing the PDI of safety when they used media (cameras and the ability to post on the internet) to deter Israeli abuse against Gazans.<sup>138</sup> Additionally, other aid agencies are addressing SDIs related to social participation.

Since Hamas was considered by most to be a terrorist group who simply won an election, aid organizations had to tread softly in Gaza rather than be viewed as helping Hamas exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence. As aid workers learned during the blockade and Israeli invasion in December 2008, striking a balance between their donors in the West, Hamas, and the Israelis, while providing for the needs of Palestinians is no simple matter. Figure 18 depicts how they attempted to strike this balance.

Need	Issue preventing fulfillment	How did intervening forces fix the void?	Long-term consequences effecting fulfillment	Additional fixes
<b>Metabolism (needs 1-4)</b>	Blockade of gaza causes spike in prices, although there are adequate supplies of food. Difficulty in establishing distribution points due to damaged infrastructure, buildings, and lack of operational vehicles.	UNRWA provided limited assistance to Palestinian refugees (70% of Gaza residents) on top of standard hardship allowances. WFP distributes aid to over 1 million.	Hamas interdicts / harasses aid distribution; they want to be seen as facilitator (if not distributor) of aid. This brought them to power in 2006. Some aid orgs forced to give names of recipients, with consequences to FSS fulfillment. <i>Providing aid has stigma of helping Hamas and relieving Israel of responsibilities of an occupying power.</i>	Joint protection & livelihood approach targets at risk areas with water and food aid; attempting to stave off displacement.
<b>Safety</b>	Any area suspected of housing Hamas personnel attacked. Areas of refuge targeted. Displacements of civilians during Cast Lead are common; leads to physical and psychological dangers.	Int'l aid organizations use modern communications connectivity to monitor and report abuses. Limited effects seen at local and tactical levels. Community-protection committees emerge.	Presence of cameras and westerners tends to deter violence, if for no other reason than fear of "CNN Effect". Int'l community recognizes ineffectiveness of aid without relative safety of those receiving it.	Aid orgs recognize effectiveness of joint protection & livelihood approach; establishes links between effected peoples and advocate outlets. "Protection Communities" established.
<b>Thermoregulation</b>	Damaged houses from the effects of Cast Lead. Restricted access of building supplies. Widespread displacements.	UNRWA payed damage payments to some homeowners. Aid handouts allow some to rent rooms.	Continued blockade restriction of building supplies (concrete) hinders reconstruction activities.	Aid orgs interested in progress are forced to "unwittingly" contract with tradesmen who use smuggled materials.
<b>Medical Care</b>	Access of medical centers during Cast Lead is restricted due to fighting and internal checkpoints established by Israelis.	Some instances of tactical-level health care interventions by aid workers. Programs started to provide artificial limbs to those in need.	Israel allows direct delivery of medical aid only. LOCs inside of Gaza damaged, effecting ability to get those in need to care facilities.	Joint protection & livelihood approach targets at-risk areas with health aid.
<b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>	Schools used as shelters. Young girls and sons married off early. Children taken from school to work. Blockade & Cast Lead further limits job prospects.	Livelihood interventions; vocational training, micro-credit/finance, alternate income-generating strategies.	Most programs exist on a 12-18 month funding cycle, limiting long-term effectiveness. Overall effectiveness: people still dependent on some aid.	Joint protection & livelihood approach targets at-risk areas with educational services.
<b>Social Participation</b>	Fighting and blockade causes displacement and closing of schools and workplaces.	Aid devoted to helping people cope with effects of exposure to violence through psycho-social activities.	Damaged Gazan infrastructure and internal checkpoints inhibit people's ability to get to program locations.	Joint protection & livelihood approach prevents displacement and retains access to lands.
<b>Adaptation</b>				
<b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b>	Commissariat (agriculture, grazing, & fishing) uprooted due to blockade, 2006/8 droughts, and effects of frost and snow. Prices spike. Econ. system now internally-based and augmented by smuggling instead of int'l free trade.	Emergency job creation schemes enacted (short-term) for cash and/or food. Vocational training and micro-credit programmes offered. WFP distributes vouchers to urban poor and unemployed to offset high prices. Drought responses distribute water, seed, and fodder.	Smuggling and Aid cycles emerge in the Econ. System. Hamas regulates tunnel traffic. Aid recipients sell handouts; some "double dip" from different aid orgs. Aid response does little to address long-term concerns of unemployment and economic decline.	Aid organizations moving from status-based aid targeting to needs-based targeting. Larger aid orgs recognize effectiveness of integrating protection and livelihood programs.
<b>Social Control</b>	The international aid community did not engage in measures to improve social control, as this conflicted with the already tenuous situation of aid in Gaza possible helping Hamas. Other aid measures had unintended effects on social control, as these efforts delegitimized Hamas by showing their difficulty in ensuring the population could meet its basic needs. This effect is what Israel and the western diplomatic community hoped for with the blockade of Gaza.			

Figure 18. FSS-Fulfillment enabled by the International Aid Community in Gaza  
*Source:* Developed by the Author, with information from Congressional Research Service, "Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009)," *CRS Report to Congress* (19 February 2009): 13-15; International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," *Middle East Report* no. 85 (23 April 2009): I, 9; Suzanne Jaspars, Susan O'Callaghan, and Sara Pavanello, *Losing Ground: Protection and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2009), 38-42, 50.

An enduring lesson is the importance of viewing protection and livelihood courses of action as one in the same; which O'Callaghan, Jaspars, and Pavanello call the "Joint Protection and Livelihoods Approach."<sup>139</sup> Smaller uni-issue organizations in Gaza were not seeing the same results that larger organizations were, due to the deteriorated security situation in Gaza. These multi-issue organizations, like the ICRC, CARE, and Oxfam, had many different programs in both the protection and livelihood realms.

Because they were all under the visibility of one organization, leaders within these groups could synchronize efforts and ensure these projects were working in a symbiotic manner, rather than in a vacuum or against each other.<sup>140</sup> This near-simultaneity in planning and execution is important as it ensures a unity of effort, especially since most livelihood-related problems are ones that link directly to a lack of security.<sup>141</sup>

The international aid community did not establish themselves as Rule Makers in Gaza after Operation Cast Lead. However, because of the perceptive power associated with reconstruction and its demonstration of FSS-fulfilling competence, the aid community was presented with a quandary: The Hamas government in Gaza insisted that all aid go through them before delivery to those in need. By agreeing to this measure, the international aid community would be “putting a Hamas face” on their aid operations, allowing Hamas to exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence, and indirectly reinforcing Hamas’ role as Rule Makers in Gaza.<sup>142</sup> For those organizations that considered Hamas a terrorist organization, this was bitter decision: allow Hamas to leverage aid for their power consolidation, or allow the Gazan people to suffer. In the end, many aid organizations chose to provide aid, even if it helped Hamas.<sup>143</sup>

No aid organizations specifically focused on Rule Teaching, but aid was requested for the repair of over 30 schools.<sup>144</sup> Additionally, no portion of the aid community focused on the establishment of a rule interpreting or adjudicating body.

Ironically, although international aid agencies try to remain neutral and unarmed,<sup>145</sup> they were able to serve as Rule Enforcers in situations where Israeli forces

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<sup>145</sup>With the exception of protection elements hired by aid agencies in situations of extreme danger.

were violating the rights of Gazans. Aid workers found that the threat of their documenting and reporting abuses and atrocities was sometimes enough to deter the violence before it occurred.<sup>145</sup> Aid workers began to realize that advocacy could far outrange lethal weapons, and was an effective way they could protect those who were vulnerable.

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<sup>1</sup>The United States Army and The United States Marine Corps, 98.

<sup>2</sup>The United States Army, *The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual*, 1-28, 2-12, 3-15.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 2-12.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 1-28, 2-12, 3-15.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 2-12, 3-3.

<sup>6</sup>United States Institute for Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 10-162.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 8-100, 8-102.

<sup>8</sup>Malinowski, 92.

<sup>9</sup>Fred C. Cuny and Richard B. Hill, *Famine, Conflict, and Response: A Basic Guide* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1999), 2.

<sup>10</sup>Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Straw Man In The Wind,” *National Interest* (January/February 2008): 26-7.

<sup>11</sup>Corning, *Holistic Darwinism*, 285-6.

<sup>12</sup>Maslow, 379.

<sup>13</sup>Doyal and Gough, 199.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 205.

<sup>15</sup>David Leonard, “Recreating Political Order: The Somali Systems Today,” *Institute of Development Studies Working Paper* 2009, no. 316 (February, 2009): 17.

<sup>16</sup>Maslow, 379.

<sup>17</sup>Malinowski, 120, 125.

<sup>18</sup>Henrik Urdal, *Too Poor For Peace: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 94.

<sup>19</sup>Lael Brainard, Derek Chollet, and Vinca LaFleur, *Too Poor For Peace: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 11.

<sup>20</sup>Maslow, 382-3.

<sup>21</sup>Brainard, Chollet, and LaFleur, 12.

<sup>22</sup>Marc Sommers, *Too Poor For Peace: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 108.

<sup>23</sup>Malinowski, 93; Corning, *Holistic Darwinism*, 290.

<sup>24</sup>Doyal and Gough, 202.

<sup>25</sup>Maslow, 383.

<sup>26</sup>Susan Rice, *Too Poor For Peace: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 38; Edward Miguel, *Too Poor For Peace: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 51.

<sup>27</sup>Malinowski, 171.

<sup>28</sup>Sommers, 111.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 110.

<sup>30</sup>Maslow, 381-2.

<sup>31</sup>Doyal and Gough, 77-8.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 215.

<sup>33</sup>Clara Koppell and Anita Sharma, “Preventing the Next Wave of Conflict: Understanding Non-Traditional Threats to Global Stability,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, Conflict Prevention Project (2003): 98.

<sup>34</sup>Christopher Reenock, Michael Bernhard, and David Sobek, “Regressive Socioeconomic Distribution and Democratic Survival,” *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007): 694.

<sup>35</sup>Fred C. Cuny and Richard B. Hill, *Famine, Conflict, and Response: A Basic Guide* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1999), 29.

<sup>36</sup>Koppell and Sharma, 32, 64, 80-84.

<sup>37</sup>Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal, “Breaking the Waves? Does Education Mediate the Relationship Between Youth Bulges and Political Violence?” *The World Bank Policy Research Paper* no. 5114 (November, 2009): 25.

<sup>38</sup>Koppell and Sharma, 80

<sup>39</sup>Maslow, 372.

<sup>40</sup>Koppell and Sharma, 98.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Corning, *Biological Adaptation in Human Societies: A ‘Basic Needs’ Approach*, 62.

<sup>43</sup>David Simon, “Development Reconsidered: New Directions in Development Thinking,” *Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography* 79, no. 4 (1997): 185.

<sup>44</sup>Stephen Hoadley, “The Rise and Fall of the Basic Needs Approach,” *Cooperation and Conflict* XVI (1981): 158.

<sup>45</sup>Leonard, 2.

<sup>46</sup>Doyal and Gough, 81, 83.

<sup>47</sup>The United States Army, *The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual*, 2-12.

<sup>48</sup>Doyal and Gough, 83.

<sup>49</sup>Malinowski, 104-5.

<sup>50</sup>Maslow, 379.

<sup>51</sup>Cuny and Hill, 3-4.

<sup>52</sup>Malinowski, 98.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 99.

<sup>54</sup>Oxfam, [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam\\_in\\_action/emergencies/ethiopia\\_drought.html#](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam_in_action/emergencies/ethiopia_drought.html#) (accessed 2 October 2009).

<sup>55</sup>Corning, *Holistic Darwinism*, 285-6.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 294.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 295.

<sup>58</sup>Malinowski, 93.

<sup>59</sup>Joel K. Bourne, “The End of Plenty: The Global Food Crisis,” *National Geographic* (June 2009): 46-7.

<sup>60</sup>Doyal and Gough, 84-5.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 87.

<sup>62</sup>Malinowski, 130.

<sup>63</sup>Doyal and Gough, 87.

<sup>64</sup>Corning, *Holistic Darwinism*, 296.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 296.

<sup>66</sup>Malinowski, 128-9.

<sup>67</sup>Doyal and Gough, 88-9.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Doyal and Gough, 88.

<sup>70</sup>Charles Byler, PhD, “Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913,” *Military Review* (May-June, 2005): 45.

<sup>71</sup>Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1901-1902*, 133-4, 121.

<sup>72</sup>Major Ethan H., Harding, USMC, “The Next Time: Preparing Now for Better Utilization of Civil Affairs to Master the Cycle of Counterinsurgency Operations,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, <http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/webarticle1Jan08.asp> (accessed 19 July 2009).

<sup>73</sup>Byler, 43.

<sup>74</sup>Klingner and Jones, 151.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Byler, 42-43.

<sup>77</sup>Klingner and Jones, 151.

<sup>78</sup>Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, 135.

<sup>79</sup>Byler, 43.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>81</sup>Victoria Pohle, “The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive” (Monograph, Rand, January 1969), 23-24, 32.

<sup>82</sup>Major Gordon M. Wells, U.S. Army, “No More Vietnams: CORDS as a Model for Counterinsurgency Campaign Design” (Monograph, U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 21-22.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>84</sup>Matthew D. Pinard, “The American and South Vietnamese Pacification Efforts During the Vietnam War” (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2002), 58.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 59-61.

<sup>86</sup>Dale Andrade and LtCol James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army (Ret), Ph.D., “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” *Military Review* (March-April, 2006): 14.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Schoux, 7.

<sup>89</sup>Pinard, 112.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., 113.

<sup>91</sup>Schoux, 13.

<sup>92</sup>The United States Army and The United States Marine Corps, 73-75.

<sup>93</sup>Angela Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shulka, “Money In the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations” (Monograph, Rand, 2007), 36.

<sup>94</sup>Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill, “Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004), 26, 37.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., 34.

<sup>96</sup>Andrade and Willbanks, 15-16.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 22.

<sup>98</sup>Rabasa, Warner, Chalk, Khilko, and Shulka, 34.

<sup>99</sup>Record and Terrill, 34.

<sup>100</sup>Pohle, 11, 15.

<sup>101</sup>Schoux, 15-16.

<sup>102</sup>Andrade and Willbanks, 20.

<sup>103</sup>Rabasa, Warner, Chalk, Khilko, and Shulka, 34.

<sup>104</sup>Andrade and Willbanks, 20.

<sup>105</sup>Rabasa, Warner, Chalk, Khilko, and Shulka, 37.

<sup>106</sup>Andrade and Willbanks, 16-17.

<sup>107</sup>Rabasa, Warner, Chalk, Khilko, and Shulka, 31, 37.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>109</sup>Pohle, 21-22.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>111</sup>Buu Hoan, “The South Vietnamese Economy in Transition to Peace and after,” *Asian Survey* 11, no. 4 (April 1971): 310-311.

<sup>112</sup>Leonard, 2.

<sup>113</sup>Shaul Shay, *Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 73, 77, 79.

<sup>114</sup>Bjorn Moller, “The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors,” *Danish Institute for International Studies Report* no. 3 (2009): 13.

<sup>115</sup>Peter T. Leeson, “Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse” (Monograph, University of West Virginia, 2003), 25.

<sup>116</sup>Joakim Gundel and Ahmed A. Omar Dharbaxo, “The Predicament of the ‘Oday’: The Role of Traditional Structures in Security, Rights, Law, and Development in Somalia” (monograph, Danish Refugee Council, November 2006), iii-v, 27-8.

<sup>117</sup>Ryan Ford, Benjamin Powell, and Alex Nowrasteh, “Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?,” *The Independent Institute*, Working Paper no. 64 (November 30, 2006): 21.

<sup>118</sup>Moller, 13.

<sup>119</sup>Leonard, 18.

<sup>120</sup>Leeson, 25.

<sup>121</sup>Gundel and Dharbaxo, 6.

<sup>122</sup>Leeson, 25.

<sup>123</sup>Ryan Ford, Powell, and Nowrasteh, 19.

<sup>124</sup>Leeson, 21.

<sup>125</sup>Gundel and Dharbaxo, v-vi.

<sup>126</sup>Broning.

<sup>127</sup>Colonel Ben-Zion Mehr, IDF, *Hamas—How has a Terrorist Organization Become a Political Power?* (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2008): 7, 22-3.

<sup>128</sup>Keene, 3.

<sup>129</sup>Mehr, 14, 17.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>131</sup>Indyk.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.

<sup>133</sup>Jaspars, O’Callaghan, and Pavanello, 34.

<sup>134</sup>International Crisis Group, i.

<sup>135</sup>Congressional Research Service, “Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009),” *CRS Report to Congress* (19 February 2009): 13.

<sup>136</sup>International Crisis Group, 9.

<sup>137</sup>Congressional Research Service, 13-14.

<sup>138</sup>Jaspars, O'Callaghan, and Pavanello, 40.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., 40-41.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., 40-42.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., 50.

<sup>142</sup>Congressional Research Service, 15.

<sup>143</sup>International Crisis Group, 28.

<sup>144</sup>Congressional Research Service, 14.

<sup>145</sup>Jaspars, O'Callaghan, and Pavanello, 39-40.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The information in the previous four chapters synthesizes existing research from the social science arena and identifies individual needs and group adaptations that apply to all stable societies, regardless of demographics. It uses this knowledge to identify and prioritize drivers of instability. This theoretical framework provides a baseline for analyzing case studies of historical interventions that produce parameters for the unique conduct of stability operations.

This knowledge becomes increasingly important as the four services within the DoD expand their capacity to conduct stability operations and seek to train new operators. The theoretical base this thesis provides enables new personnel to better understand societal interrelatedness and why certain stability tasks are executed at certain times. By arriving with this understanding intact, stability operators will experience more execution and success rather than the trial and error that has been experienced by many new stability operations personnel thus far in the War on Terror.

#### Conclusions

##### The Pillars of Stability Operations

The Pillars of Stability Operations nest into the Principles of Joint Operations, and add additional parameters that account for the uniqueness of stability operations when compared to other lethal operations. They apply regardless of demographics and incorporate theoretical basis with enduring lessons learned from historical operations. This may or may not mean that military forces must accomplish these tasks. What is

important is that they are accomplished and appropriate conditions are set, regardless of who completes them. The Pillars of Stability Operations are listed below:

1. Ensure fulfillment of the Fundamentals of Social Stability. See the expanded list in figure 19.




Figure 19. The Fundamentals of Social Stability (obviated)  
*Source:* Developed by the author.

2. Implement Contextually-Appropriate Capacity-building Approaches. This involves developing COAs that address issues specific to the area, rather than western

“cookie cutter” solutions. For instance, many official and pundits emphasize “spreading democracy.” While this is a noble ideal, the United States may not possess the patience for the successful execution of this “best practice.” Instead, in order to implement a culturally-acceptable, stable government, stability operators are better off executing the “smart practice” of focusing on an inclusive government that leverages existing social power structures;<sup>1</sup> democracy can come later. “Contextually-appropriate” also involves gaining indigenous buy-in, as they will eventually inherit the results of our actions.

3. Manage Information Flow. Stability operations are a race between two competing groups to see who can exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence within the population they seek to control. Because each competitor will seek to discredit the other, no two groups can be simultaneously perceived as competent. Because of this, the ability to project messages of competence, along with evidence of an opponent’s incompetence, is vital to stability operations success. This critical thread is witnessed all the case studies in chapter 4. In many cases, SDIs and TDIs may go unresolved if the populace believes their sacrifice is justified, and the social controlling element is competent in seeing their struggle is rewarded.

As the management of information flow and reputation is directly linked to legitimacy of both the intervening force and the regime they seek to strengthen, so is expectation management amongst the population. While it is tempting to promise quick and grand improvements on the path to securing a reputation of FSS-fostering competence, if the promises are not backed with action, a force’s reputation will be greatly tarnished amongst the population.

**4. Near-Simultaneity.** This is the symbiotic relationship between lethal and non-lethal operations, depicted in figure 12. Case studies from chapter 4 show successful intervening forces quickly demonstrate a reestablishment of the physical safety, and follow that with fulfillment of the other FSS. Doing so, and advertising one's proficiency in this area, wins popular trust and support. This must be offset with non-lethal measures in the form of aid and development projects,<sup>2</sup> so the population can see tangible results of progress that directly relate to the stability operator's presence. This combination of lethal operations, capacity-building, and information operations eventually yields actionable intelligence that leads to betterment of the group's overall FSS-fulfillment. Failure to do so leaves the population viewing intervening forces, and those they are trying to legitimize, as oppressive.<sup>3</sup>

**5. Restraint.** The case studies in chapter 4 show a theme of forces enjoying success by demonstrating restraint when engagements with the enemy had the potential to endanger those civilians they were supposed to secure. This does not discount the importance of winning lethal engagements, but advocates that leaders may have to better choose the “civilian terrain” they engage the enemy on.

**6. Avoid the Population “Tipping Point.”** During a pacification, stability, or counterinsurgency operations, the intervening force must protect against the tendency for the population to lose faith in the legitimacy of its leadership and military. Heavy-handed use of firepower can cause the population to become ambivalent towards which side wins the contest for control, choosing instead to “ride it out” and see who wins.<sup>4</sup> Worse, corruption can cause a lack of faith in the legitimacy of leaders that drives the populace towards the side of the adversary. The importance of such restraint was recognized by

General Bell in the Philippines, some Viet Cong elements during Tet,<sup>5</sup> and ignored by many regular combat units during operations in South Vietnam.<sup>6</sup> Also, Al Qaeda in Iraq's heavy-handedness drove the Sunni tribes of Anbar Province to their "awakening" inside the American sphere of influence.

To protect against this, there must be a symbiotic balance of security improvements, destruction of insurgent capability and capacity, and an increase in basic services and quality of life for the population. Additionally, stability operators must leverage the use of information management to convince the population that any existing voids in needs-satisfaction are temporary and that their sacrifice is for a legitimate cause.

7. Secure the population where they are, not where you want them to be. While it may be tempting to move populations from areas that are hard to secure to ground more defensible against insurgent actions, the stability operator must resist this. Catastrophic effects of such actions were witnessed in the Philippines and in Vietnam during the early pacification efforts prior to the implementation of CORDS. While security is a critical aspect of stability operations, security through relocation causes more PDIs than it solves.

A better measure is the sealing off of access to areas of interest. This requires establishing checkpoints, documentation of inhabitants, and a resilient security presence. Such measures will cause SDIs related to *social participation* and will disrupt the labor and transportation portions of the *Economic System*. However, balancing these protective restrictions with other quality of life and capacity-building improvements demonstrates progress to the effected population.

8. Transitions. Engaging in stability operations requires intervening military forces to provide an initial surge of security, governance, and economic resources until

the indigenous population and state are able to assume these responsibilities. The large question is, when do we execute this transfer? Failure to correctly time transitions from the intervening force to indigenous authorities and effectively wean them off our influence will cause collapse, followed by a vacuum of capacity. This void, and its fulfillment will be quickly contested by groups who seek to control the area by demonstrating their FSS-fulfillment fostering competence. Three critical areas of transition require attention: security, governance, and the economy.

Once capable, security responsibilities can be slowly transitioned to indigenous forces, with intervening forces serving as a backup, and eventually transiting from theater. However, the timing is critical. The ARVN's assumptions of primary security responsibility under the Vietnamization program was premature, as evidenced by the debacle associated with their invasion of Laos. In this case, a transition that should have legitimized their capabilities (and those of the GVN), only served to undermine the ARVN's reputation more. Contrast this with Pershing's increased use of Filipino forces to extend government reach in the rural island areas,<sup>7</sup> which increased their legitimacy and overall ownership.

The transfer of responsibility to credible indigenous Essential Elements of Social Control is difficult as well. A failure to do so in a timely manner may result in SDIs related to Social Freedoms, as the population may see the intervention as a veil for colonization. However, a timely transition when native personnel and agencies are not ready will delegitimize them as capable fosterers of FSS-fulfillment. Contextually, the U.S. in the Philippines struck an effective balance in their decision to leverage some aristocratic legacy personnel from the Spanish colonial regime.<sup>8</sup> While this did expose a

Social Freedom-related SDI, the U.S. was able to utilize the administrative skills of the Filipino elites to better establish stability. In this case, the perceived slight at Social Freedoms was worth the capability in governance. When possible, intervening forces should leverage existing social structures to enable social control.

Transfer of the economy from post-conflict to peacetime requires an inoculation against “Dutch Disease.” As was the case with South Vietnam, an intervening force cannot both create jobs and reconstruct a post-conflict area with creating some artificial cycles in the Economic System. If the intervening force fails to inject large amounts of capital, it will fail to create enough jobs, leading to unemployment, which leads to masses of MAMs who are vulnerable to extremist rhetoric and/or employment. If the force pulls out of an area too quickly, the indigenous Economic System will be unable to absorb the vast amount of newly unemployed later who previously worked in the artificial security-related cycle.

To protect against the effects of Dutch Disease, an intervening force must incorporate a balanced approach by strengthening the other vital<sup>8</sup> cycles of the Economic Cycle with development aid that will build their infrastructure and capacity<sup>9</sup> to absorb additional labor when artificial security-related jobs depart with intervening forces and their aid. This is critical, as Security Cycles in post-conflict Economic Systems are typically too big for the country’s GDP to support over the long-term.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, to allow the indigenous government to compensate for the temporary loss of a large and taxable labor force, the intervening (and now withdrawing) force must include some

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<sup>8</sup> The four vital Cycles within the Economic System that must exist and function correctly in order to avoid societal catastrophe are the Commissariat, Thermoregulation, Education and Training of New Members, and Security.

stabilization aid to ease the transition of the labor market from one that grew around the artificial security-related spending cycle, to one where that cycle is more reflective of a peacetime economy.<sup>11</sup>

Failure to correctly time Transitions will result in failures within respective economic Cycles. This will cascade to a loss of government legitimacy and allow the enemy to win the battle of perception in FSS-fostering competence.

**THE PILLARS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS**  
Using Social-Science to Fill the Gap Between the Joint Operating Principles and the Stability Operations Framework  
***The Pillars: rooted in social science, applicable across demographics***

***Analysis of respective case studies through the lens of the FSS deduces the following Pillars:***

**1. Ensure FSS-fulfillment... and let people know about it**

- *Stability Operations are a race to exude a perception of competence in fostering FSS-fulfillment.*

**2. Contextually-Appropriate Capacity-Building Approaches**

- Make sure courses of action have native buy-in and address the Drivers of Instability.

**3. Manage Information Flow**

- Tell the population how good your allies and you are doing (be honest) and vilify the enemy.

**4. Near-Simultaneity of Lethal and Non-lethal Operations**

- Symbiotic relationship of lethal operations and non-lethal actions.

**5. Restraint**

- The fine line between fostering FSS fulfillment & doing too much.
- Ensure the actions of forces to not make additional insurgents.

**6. Avoid the Population “Tipping Point”**

- Effected by legitimacy and restraint, does the population think the intervening force and native government act in their best interests; *are they perceived as the most competent fosterer of FSS-fulfillment?*
- Operational difficulty increases exponentially when the population becomes ambivalent to who controls the area, or openly supports the adversary.

**7. Protect the population where they are... not where you want them to be**

- As tempting as relocation to more defensible terrain may be, the violations of other FSS are too costly

**8. Transitions**

- Security, Governance, and Economy
- Ensure timings legitimize the institutions assuming responsibility

Figure 20. The Pillars of Stability Operations  
Source: Developed by author.

## Effects on Existing Doctrine

Taken as a whole, the frameworks and stability-related tasks contained in *Counterinsurgency*, *Stability Operations*, and *Guiding Principles* are a comprehensive list for post-conflict situations. What is needed is an understanding of *why* these are correct. Recognizing aspects of basic needs and societal interrelatedness on the ground allows stability operators to expand their analysis past the binding limits of historically-based doctrine. This allows operators to put purpose to respective tasks, decide resource prioritization against recognized PDIs, SDIs, and TDIs, and generally formulate contextually-appropriate COAs that defeat root causes of conflict. Failure to do so promotes the continued dogmatic execution of tasks because “the manual says so” or “they did it this way in [insert historical situation].”

While many of the “Pillars of Stability Operations” relate to and validate some of the “Cross-cutting Principles,” “Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” and “Stability Operations Framework,” the understanding gained by the theoretical basing of the “Pillars” in social science that gives them utility regardless of changing dynamics. This knowledge will greatly enable future stability operators’ ability to effect new interventions.

This thesis identifies foundational gaps in current stability operations-related doctrine. Eventually, when subsequent rewrites of existing doctrine are undertaken, the theoretical information from this thesis needs to be incorporated. Specifically, this information is valid to FM 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-90, *Tactics*. *Counterinsurgency* needs to incorporate the FSS and the Drivers of Instability in chapter 3, as a lead-in to understanding aspects of society. Additionally, it can incorporate and understanding of

the Pillars of Stability Operations as an appendix, for better understanding of how the tactics contained FM 3-24 in effect other related operations. Inside of *Stability Operations*, incorporate the FSS in chapter 1 prior to “Strategy for Stability Operations” as a foundation for future understanding in chapter 2. *Guiding Principles* can incorporate the FSS prior to section 2 as a theoretical baseline for stability operations.

To compensate for this limited scope and applicability, *Counterinsurgency, Guiding Principles* and *Stability Operations* need rooting in social science, to ensure applicability regardless of changing demographics. Contemporary lessons-learned are valuable, but only if they are viewed through a lens of common social behaviors, needs, and adaptations. This need for globally applicable doctrine will manifest itself as new generations of stability operators, who lack the fruits of trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan, embark on new interventions that require quick problem framing, solutions, and adjustments along the way. Rooting stability operations doctrine in social science fosters execution in success in future operations, as compared to the trial and error experienced in the past.

### Recommendations

Operationally, a system of indicators, based on the FSS, needs to be developed for Combatant Commands (COCOM) to track potential for instability. This is a stability-related version of Botswana’s Rapid Conflict Prevention Support (RCPS) program.<sup>12</sup> Identified fragile areas would then be targeted with stability-related responses. Depending on demographics internal to each country and region, COCOMs would develop and maintain stability response plans, in the same fashion that they do for

operational contingency plans. However, these stability response plans will focus on repairing “gaps” in the FSS.

Doctrinally, continued analysis is needed to determine if the FSS is a suitable replacement for the Stability Operations Framework in FM 3-07. In *Guiding Principles*, analysis is recommended to determine if the Pillars of Stability Operations are appropriate as an appendix, allowing civilian counterparts to better understand and synchronize their efforts with military forces. Additionally, a determination is needed on the suitability of the FSS as an analysis framework in this manual.

For training and education, this thesis recommends the incorporation of social science instruction for new civil affairs students, and additional training in identifying and comprehending the FSS.

Continued study is recommended to determine how FSS-fulfillment was accomplished in Iraq and in Afghanistan to further validate or identify flaws in the Pillars of Stability Operations. Additionally, more empirical research must be conducted to determine what events trigger unstable behavior when individuals’ safety needs are violated. This will lead to more clarification on where a population’s “Tipping Point” resides.

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<sup>1</sup>Record and Terrill, 54-5.

<sup>2</sup>Andrade and Willbanks, 22.

<sup>3</sup>Byler, 45.

<sup>4</sup>Wells, 22-23.

<sup>5</sup>Pohle, 21.

<sup>6</sup>Rabasa, Warner, Chalk, Khilko, and Shulka, 33.

<sup>7</sup>Byler, 44.

<sup>8</sup>Boot, 115.

<sup>9</sup>Hoan, 316.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 319.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 316-317.

<sup>12</sup>Miguel, 57-8.

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